The PBGC Wins a Case Whenever the Debtor Keeps its Pension Plan by Goldowitz, Israel et al.
Marquette Benefits and Social Welfare Law Review
Volume 16
Issue 2 Spring Article 2
2015
The PBGC Wins a Case Whenever the Debtor
Keeps its Pension Plan
Israel Goldowitz
Garth Wilson
Erin Kim
Kirsten Bender
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/benefits
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Benefits and Social Welfare Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information,
please contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Recommended Citation
Israel Goldowitz et al., The PBGC Wins a Case Whenever the Debtor Keeps its Pension Plan, 16 Marq. Ben. & Soc. Welfare L. Rev. 257
(2015).
GOLDOWITZ (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/15  10:29 AM 
 
257 
THE PBGC WINS A CASE WHENEVER THE DEBTOR 
KEEPS ITS PENSION PLAN 
Israel Goldowitz*, Garth Wilson, Erin Kim, and Kirsten 
Bender 
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the federal 
agency charged with insuring private-sector defined benefit 
pension plans, has long had a prominent role in corporate 
bankruptcies.  PBGC focuses its effort on the continuation of 
pension plans, in true reorganizations and in sales of businesses.  
To this end, ERISA has made it more difficult for a sponsor to 
terminate a plan in its own economic interest.  For example, a 
sponsor’s latitude to terminate an underfunded plan was limited 
to circumstances involving the sponsor’s financial distress.  
Likewise, the termination premium, which was added to ERISA 
in recent years, is an obligation that survives bankruptcy and it 
may help to deter some unwarranted terminations.  
Unfortunately, in some cases, PBGC must seek plan termination, 
and PBGC then seeks to maximize its recoveries.  These are blunt 
tools, however, and the case law has further dulled them.  With 
plan continuation the preferred outcome, PBGC succeeds in its 
statutory mission whenever a sponsor emerges from bankruptcy 
with its pension plan ongoing. 
  
 
* Mr. Goldowitz is Chief Counsel of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and 
an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University Law Center.  Mr. Wilson is an 
Assistant Chief Counsel and Ms. Kim and Ms. Bender are attorneys with PBGC.  
Any opinions expressed in this article are the authors’ own, and do not represent the 
views of the PBGC or any other organization.  The authors gratefully acknowledge 
the assistance of Michelle Li, Paralegal Specialist, PBGC.  The authors also 
gratefully acknowledge the comments of James Armbruster, Christopher Bone, 
Charles Finke, John Ginsberg, John Hanley, Karen Morris, Bruce Perlin, Neela 
Ranade, Nathaniel Rayle, and Gail Sevin. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC or the 
Corporation) is the federal agency charged with insuring 
private-sector defined benefit pension plans.  In carrying out its 
statutory mission, PBGC devotes much of its day-to-day 
attention to financially troubled plan sponsors who are either in 
bankruptcy or may enter bankruptcy. 
Part I of this paper discusses the statutory framework 
governing the pension insurance system with a focus on PBGC’s 
purpose and powers, termination of defined benefit pension 
plans, PBGC payment of benefits, and employer liability to 
PBGC.  Part II is a primer on certain key bankruptcy concepts 
that apply to business reorganizations or liquidations and to the 
rights of creditors.  Part III addresses PBGC’s experience in 
bankruptcy, including some important judicial decisions that, for 
better or for worse, are part of the legal framework in which 
PBGC operates. 
II. TITLE IV BASICS 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY 
CORPORATION 
1. History, Purpose, and Operation of the Corporation 
Before 1974, the process for terminating a defined benefit 
pension plan was relatively unregulated.1  Notably, an employer 
had no obligation to make up the funding shortfall after a plan 
was terminated.2  As a result, companies facing financial 
difficulty could simply walk away from their pension liabilities, 
leaving participants without the retirement income promised to 
them.3  It took a major crisis—the termination of the Studebaker 
Corporation pension plan in 1963, in which 4,000 auto workers 
lost some or all of their pension benefits—to prompt Congress to 
act.4 
 
 1.  See JEFFREY LEWIS ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 9-3 (3rd ed. 2012) 
[hereinafter EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW]. 
 2.  Id. at 9-5–9-6. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  History of PBGC, PBGC, http://www.pbgc.gov/about/who-we-are/pg/history-
GOLDOWITZ(DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/15  10:29 AM 
262 BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16.2 
PBGC was established by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).5  It is a wholly-owned United 
States government corporation, and the federal agency charged 
with administering the termination insurance program under 
Title IV of ERISA.6  The Corporation is governed by a Board of 
Directors composed of three members: the Secretary of Labor, 
the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce.7  
Daily operations are overseen by the Director, who is nominated 
by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and 
serves a five-year term at the pleasure of the President and the 
Board of Directors.8 
Congress declared Title IV to have three purposes to be 
carried out by PBGC: 
(1) to encourage the continuation and maintenance of 
voluntary private pension plans for the benefit of 
their participants, 
(2) to provide for the timely and uninterrupted 
payment of pension benefits to participants and 
beneficiaries under plans to which [Title IV] 
applies, and 
(3) to maintain premiums established by the 
corporation . . . at the lowest level consistent with 
carrying out its obligation under [Title IV].9 
In furtherance of these purposes, PBGC has the authority to 
adopt bylaws, rules, and regulations;10 to exercise administrative 
subpoena powers;11 to “sue and be sued” in its own name;12 and 
to litigate disputes “through its own counsel” before all domestic 
courts and tribunals.13 
 
of-pbgc.html (last visited May 8, 2015). 
 5.  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012)). 
 6. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012); see also id. § 1302(b) (providing that “the 
corporation has the powers conferred on a nonprofit corporation under the District of 
Colombia Nonprofit Corporation Act”), “Title IV” is the popular name of Subchapter 
III of Chapter 18 of Title 29 of the United States Code.  29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461. 
 7.  29 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1). 
 8.  Id. § 1302(a), (c); WILLIAM G. BEYER, ET AL., ABI’S PENSION MANUAL: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PENSION ISSUES ARISING IN BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY CASES 22 
(Carol Connor Flowe et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter BEYER]. 
 9.  29 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(1)-(3). 
 10.  Id. § 1302(b)(3). 
 11.  Id. § 1303(a); BEYER, supra note 8, at 22. 
 12.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1). 
 13.  Id.; BEYER, supra note 8, at 22 (noting that PBGC’s independent litigating 
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PBGC does not receive any general federal revenue to fund 
its insurance program.14  Instead, its operations are funded by 
premiums, assets from terminated plans trusteed by PBGC, 
recoveries from firms formerly responsible for the plans, and 
investment income.15  PBGC’s annual premiums, both flat-rate 
and variable-rate, are collected from plan sponsors in amounts 
fixed by Congress.16  In fiscal year 2014, PBGC derived $3.9 
billion in revenue from premium collections.17  Although the 
payment of premiums is required by law,18 a plan sponsor’s 
failure to pay premiums will not result in the loss of PBGC’s 
guarantee for basic benefits.19 
2. Title IV Coverage 
PBGC does not insure all pension plans.  Within the 
universe of employer-sponsored retirement plans, PBGC insures 
only benefits of private-sector, defined benefit pension plans 
subject to Title IV of ERISA.20  To be covered under Title IV, a 
plan must: (1) be an “employee pension benefit plan;” (2) be 
established or maintained by an employer, employee 
organization representing employees, or both, engaged in 
commerce or industries affecting commerce; and (3) meet tax-
qualification standards under the Internal Revenue Code 
(IRC).21  A plan is generally deemed to meet the tax-qualification 
requirement if it has received a favorable determination from 
the Internal Revenue Service.22 
Certain plans are expressly excluded from coverage under 
 
authority, “together with a broad grant of settlement authority, permits it to act 
independently and quickly without the multiple layers of government concurrences 
other agencies may need to work within”). 
 14.  2014 PBGC ANN. REP. 20, available at http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/2014-
annual-report.pdf; see also BEYER, supra note 8, at 22 (noting that “PBGC was 
designed to be financially self-sustaining and receives no funds from general tax 
revenues”). 
 15. 2014 PBGC ANN. REP. 20, supra note 14; see also EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, 
supra note 1, at 3-31 (describing sources of PBGC’s funding and its investment 
authority). 
 16.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1307. 
 17.  2014 PBGC ANN. REP. 88, supra note 14. 
 18.  2 9 U.S.C. § 1307. 
 19.  Id. § 1307(d). 
 20.  See id. § 1321. 
 21.  See id. § 1321(a) (providing two alternative statutory tests a plan must meet 
or have met to be covered under Title IV). 
 22.  EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 1, at 9-7–9-8. 
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Title IV and therefore not protected by PBGC’s guarantee.23  
Among these exceptions are “individual account plans,”24 
“governmental plans,”25 and “church plans.”26  Thus, for 
example, PBGC does not cover defined contribution plans, 
including “401(k) plans.”27  PBGC also does not cover plans that 
are established and maintained by the federal government, or 
any state or municipality.28  Also, it does not cover plans for 
employees of a church or church-affiliated hospital, school, or 
other organization unless the organization has elected to comply 
with the participation, vesting, and funding requirements of 
ERISA and the IRC.29 
3. Types of Plans Covered 
PBGC maintains two separate insurance programs: a 
single-employer program and a multiemployer program.30 
Single-employer plans are the more numerous.31  Simply 
defined as “a plan which is not a multiemployer plan,”32 a single-
employer plan is established and maintained by one employer 
(or a group of employers under common ownership) for the 
benefit of its employees.33  A multiple-employer plan, a subset of 
 
 23.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (enumerating 13 statutory exceptions to Title IV 
coverage). 
 24.  Id. § 1321(b)(1); see also id. § 1002(34) (defining term “individual account 
plan” to mean “a pension plan which provides for an individual account for each 
participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the 
participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains, and losses, and any 
forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such 
participant’s account”). 
 25.  Id. § 1321(b)(2). 
 26.  Id. § 1321(b)(3); see also 26 U.S.C. § 414(e) (2012) (defining term “church 
plan” to mean “a plan established and maintained . . . for its employees (or their 
beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or association of churches which is 
exempt from tax under [IRC] section 501”). 
 27.  29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(34), 1321(b). 
 28.  29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2).  
 29.  See id. § 1321(b)(3). 
 30.  EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 1, at 9-6. 
 31.  See 2014 PBGC ANN. REP. 5, supra note 14 (reporting that in 2014 PBGC’s 
“single-employer program protect[ed] about 31 million workers and retirees in over 
22,000 pension plans” while the “multiemployer program protect[ed] about 10 million 
workers and retirees in about 1,400 pension plans”). 
 32.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(41). 
 33.  See Glossary, PBGC, http://www.pbgc.gov/about/pg/header/glossary.html#S 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
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single-employer plans,34 is sponsored by more than one 
unrelated employer, but is not maintained under a collective 
bargaining agreement.35  PBGC has the authority to terminate, 
take over as statutory trustee, and insure the benefits of single-
employer pension plans covered under Title IV.36 
Multiemployer plans are maintained under collective 
bargaining agreements “between one or more employee 
organizations and more than one employer.”37  Commonly known 
as a Taft-Hartley plan, a multiemployer pension plan is 
administered by a board of trustees made up of an equal number 
of management and labor appointees.38  Unlike single-employer 
plans, PBGC does not terminate and trustee multiemployer 
plans facing financial distress.39  Rather, PBGC for decades has 
provided financial assistance in the form of loans to insolvent 
plans to enable them to pay benefits to the guarantee limit.40  In 
2014, faced with deepening financial distress in a minority of 
plans, potentially jeopardizing the solvency of the multiemployer 
insurance program, Congress enacted new legislation.41  Those 
amendments, among other topics, are briefly summarized in the 
next section. 
4. Minimum Funding Standards, “Downsizing” and 
Withdrawal Liability, and Tools to Address Risk from 
Certain Deeply Troubled Multiemployer Plans 
Single-employer pension plans subject to Title IV of ERISA 
are required to maintain funding levels in accordance with 
 
 34.  EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 1, at 9-54. 
 35.  COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW:  POLICY 
AND PRACTICE 33 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter MEDILL]. 
 36.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1341, 1342. 
 37.  Id. § 1002(37)(A). 
 38.  See id. § 186(c)(5); see also MEDILL, supra note 35, at 33. 
 39.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1341a. 
 40.  See id. § 1431.  The multiemployer guarantee limit is 100% of the first $11 
of the accrual rate, plus 75% of the next $33, times years of credited service, or 
$35.75 per month per year of service.  The maximum guarantee amount is sometimes 
summarized as $12,870 per year with 30 years of service.  Benefit improvements less 
than five years old are not guaranteed at all.  Id. § 1322a(a)-(c); Multiemployer 
Insurance Plan Facts, PBGC, http://www.pbgc.gov/about/factsheets/page/multi-
facts.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).   
 41.  See Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014 [hereinafter MPRA], Pub. L. 
No. 113-235, Div. O, 128 Stat. 2130, 2773 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.). 
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statutory standards.42  These provisions are mainly set forth in 
the IRC.43  In general, a plan sponsor must annually make a 
minimum required contribution to its pension plan.44  The 
sponsor’s minimum required contribution for a plan year 
“generally depends on a comparison of the value of the plan’s 
assets with the plan’s funding target and target normal cost.”45  
The “funding target” for the plan year is defined as “the present 
value of all benefits accrued or earned under the plan as of the 
beginning of the plan year.”46  The term “target normal cost” for 
a plan year loosely means the present value of all benefits 
expected to be earned in the plan year plus the amount of plan-
related expenses expected to be paid in the plan year.47  
Additional funding may be required if the plan’s poor funding 
status causes it to be deemed “at-risk.”48  Funding rules are 
complex and a pension actuary must certify the required 
contribution.49  Pension liability (the funding target) is inversely 
related to the assumed interest rate at which future benefits are 
discounted.50  Since the minimum required funding contribution 
is directly related to the funding target, the lower the assumed 
interest rate, the greater the funding burden. 
Congress provided PBGC with one important tool to enforce 
the minimum funding requirements for single-employer pension 
plans covered under Title IV.  If a plan sponsor fails to make a 
required contribution and the aggregate unpaid balance of 
missed contributions exceeds $1 million, then the plan sponsor 
must report the delinquency to PBGC.51  A lien in the amount of 
the aggregate unpaid balance arises in favor of the pension plan 
on all property of the plan sponsor and members of its 
“controlled group.”52  PBGC has sole authority to perfect and 
enforce this lien.53 
Congress provided PBGC with one other tool to shore up 
 
 42.  See 26 U.S.C. § 412 (2012). 
 43.  See id.; see also EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 1, at 5-62. 
 44.  See 26 U.S.C. § 430(a) (defining the term “minimum required contribution”). 
 45.  STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 109TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF 
H.R. 4, THE “PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006” 9 (Aug. 3, 2006). 
 46.  26 U.S.C. § 430(d)(1). 
 47.  See id. § 430(b). 
 48.  See id. § 430(i). 
 49.  See id. 
 50.  See id. 
 51.  Id. § 430(k)(4)(A). 
 52.  Id. § 430(k)(1).  The concept of “controlled group” is discussed below. 
 53.  Id. § 430(k)(5). 
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ongoing single-employer plans.  This provision, which may be 
viewed as kind of “downsizing” liability, was amended in 2014.54  
The amended statute is much more intricate in its definitions 
and exemptions than the original, but generally it imposes 
liability in the event of a workforce reduction of sufficient size 
caused by a permanent cessation of operations at a facility.55  
Subject to certain exceptions, liability is triggered by a workforce 
reduction of more than 15% of the total number of employees 
who are eligible to participate in any employee pension benefit 
plan (including a 401(k) plan) maintained by the employer.56  
This provision cross-references another that addresses 
withdrawals from multiple-employer plans, which requires the 
employer to furnish a bond or escrow to secure liability in the 
event of termination.57  Alternatively, the employer may elect to 
satisfy its liability by contributing an amount equal to the plan’s 
“unfunded vested benefits” (using a funding-target measure) in 
seven annual installments.58 
The funding rules governing multiemployer plans differ 
considerably from those for single-employer plans.  
Multiemployer plans enjoy more discretion in the choice of 
actuarial funding methods and assumptions.59  Contribution 
rates for employers are established by collective bargaining 
agreements.60  The plan must establish a “funding standard 
account,” to which specified charges and credits are made each 
year.61  If the total charges to the funding standard account are 
greater than the total credits, there is a funding “deficiency.”62  
Generally, this will obligate employers to make additional 
contributions beyond the amounts required by their collective 
 
 54.  Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 [hereinafter 
CFCAA], Pub. L. No. 113-235, Div. P, 128 Stat. 2130, 2822 (2014) (to be codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 1362(e)). 
 55.  Id. at § 1(a). 
 56.  Id.  
 57.  29 U.S.C. § 1363 (2012). 
 58.  CFCAA, Div. P, § 1(a), 128 Stat. at 2822.  The obligation to pay additional 
annual installments may cease if plan funding meets a certain threshold.  Id.  
 59.  See DAN M. MCGILL, KYLE N. BROWN, JOHN J. HALEY, SYLVESTER J.  
SCHIEBER & MARK J. WARSHAWSKY, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 638-39 
(9th ed. 2010) [hereinafter MCGILL]. 
 60.  PBGC, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, AND DEP’T OF LABOR, Multiemployer 
Pension Plans Report to Congress Required by the Pension Protection Act of 2006, at 
25 (Jan. 22, 2013), http://pbgc.gov/documents/pbgc-report-multiemployer-pension-
plans.pdf [hereinafter MULTIEMPLOYER REPORT]. 
 61.  26 U.S.C. § 431(b) (2012). 
 62.  Id.  
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bargaining agreements.63 
The financial well-being of multiemployer plans also 
depends on collection of “withdrawal liability.”  When an 
employer withdraws from an underfunded multiemployer plan, a 
statutory obligation is triggered called withdrawal liability.  
Withdrawal liability is a duty requiring the employer to continue 
funding its share of the shortfall.64  Withdrawal liability 
represents the employer’s share of “unfunded vested benefits” 
and is determined under the method elected by the plan.65  The 
plan is responsible for determining and collecting withdrawal 
liability.66 
As mentioned above, in 2014 Congress gave certain deeply 
troubled multiemployer plans new tools intended to reduce 
systemic risk to participants and the multiemployer insurance 
program.  In a complex set of statutory amendments, Congress 
gave multiemployer plans in “critical and declining” status 
authority to “suspend” benefit payments, subject to certain 
limitations (e.g., affecting benefits to participants over age 80 or 
based on disability).67  Benefit suspensions are subject to specific 
conditions and require an application to the Department of the 
Treasury (which is to consult with PBGC) and a participant 
ratification vote.68  These provisions built on concepts added to 
the statute in 2006.  The latter called for multiemployer plans in 
“endangered” and “critical” status to adopt funding improvement 
or rehabilitation plans that could include reductions of future 
accruals and, for plans in critical status, suspensions of early 
retirement subsidies and ancillary benefits, and restrictions on 
lump-sum distributions.69 
 In addition, the 2014 amendments revamped PBGC’s 
authority to approve a “partition” of a plan in “critical and 
declining” status, provided that the plan has taken all 
reasonable measures to avoid insolvency, including maximum 
benefit suspensions.70  In essence, partition enables the old plan 
 
 63.  MULTIEMPLOYER REPORT, supra note 60, at 27. 
 64.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1381 (withdrawal liability); id. § 1383 (complete 
withdrawals); id. § 1385 (partial withdrawals). 
 65.  29 U.S.C. §§ 1381(b)(1), 1391; MULTIEMPLOYER REPORT, supra note 60, at 
19. 
 66.  29 U.S.C. § 1382. 
 67.  MPRA, Div. O § 201(a)(6), 128 Stat. at 2798 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 
432(e) and 29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)). 
 68.  Id.  
 69.  See 26 U.S.C. § 432 (2012). 
 70.  MPRA, Div. O § 122(a), 128 Stat. at 2795 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1413). 
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to transfer certain liabilities to a new, insolvent plan that will 
receive financial assistance from PBGC, whereas the old plan 
will be placed on a stronger financial footing going forward.  
Both the plan created by PBGC’s partition order and the old 
plan will have the same private-sector administration as 
before.71 
The rest of this paper will largely focus on PBGC and 
single-employer plans. 
5. PBGC’s Guarantee and Limitations 
At the heart of Title IV’s pension insurance program is 
PBGC’s benefit guarantee.  Subject to important limitations, 
PBGC guarantees the payment of “all nonforfeitable benefits 
(other than benefits becoming nonforfeitable solely on account of 
the termination of a plan) under a single-employer plan which 
terminates at a time when [Title IV] applies to it.”72  PBGC’s 
regulations provide that it  
will guarantee the amount, as of the termination date, 
of a benefit provided under a plan . . . if: (1) The benefit 
is, on the termination date, a nonforfeitable benefit; (2) 
The benefit qualifies as a pension benefit as defined in 
[29 C.F.R.] § 4022.2; and (3) The participant is entitled 
to the benefit under [29 C.F.R.] § 4022.4.73 
The term “nonforfeitable benefit” has a precise statutory 
definition, but it loosely refers to a benefit for which the 
participant satisfied the plan’s vesting requirements before 
termination.74  The term “pension benefit” is defined as “a 
benefit payable as an annuity, or one or more payments related 
thereto, to a participant who permanently leaves or has 
permanently left covered employment. . . .”75  Therefore, PBGC 
does not guarantee health and welfare benefits, or certain lump-
sum death benefits even if such benefits are promised under a 
plan subject to Title IV.76 
The two principal limitations on PBGC’s guarantee are set 
 
 71.  See id.  
 72.  29 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (2012). 
 73.  29 C.F.R. § 4022.3(a) (2014). 
 74.  29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(8). 
 75.  29 C.F.R. § 4022.2. 
 76.  Guaranteed Benefits, PBGC (Feb. 17, 2015), 
https://www.pbgc.gov/wr/benefits/guaranteed-benefits.html. 
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forth in the statute.77  The first is referred to in PBGC’s 
regulations as the “maximum guaranteeable benefit.”78  It is 
described as the maximum monthly benefit provided by a plan 
that may be guaranteed, with the maximum determined using 
an “actuarial value.”79  The reference to “actuarial value” means, 
for example, that the maximum guarantee is reduced for those 
who begin to receive benefits from PBGC before age 65, because 
they will receive benefits for a longer time than if their benefits 
began at 65.80  For a plan that terminates during 2015, the 
maximum monthly guarantee for a retiree aged 65 is 
$5,011.36.81 
The second principal limitation is known informally as the 
“phase-in limit.”  It provides for a phase-in of PBGC’s guarantee 
of any benefit increase adopted or effective (whichever is later) 
during the five-year period before a plan terminates.82  The 
guarantee is phased in at the rate of 20% of the amount of the 
increase (or $20 per month, if greater) for each year the increase 
has been in effect.83  For example, if a participant’s monthly 
benefit was increased by $200 as a result of a plan amendment 
effective two years before termination, PBGC guarantees $80 of 
that increase.84 
6. PBGC Payment of Nonguaranteed Benefits 
PBGC pays guaranteed benefits, described above, 
regardless of the plan’s funded level.85  If the benefits under a 
plan are not fully guaranteed, PBGC may be able to pay a 
portion of the nonguaranteed amounts either from plan assets 
(asset-funded benefits) or from recoveries from employers 
(section 1322(c) benefits).86 
 
 77.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b). 
 78.  29 C.F.R. §§ 4022.22-.23. 
 79.  29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3). 
 80.  29 C.F.R. § 4022.23(c). 
 81.  Maximum Monthly Guarantee Tables, PBGC (2015), 
https://www.pbgc.gov/wr/benefits/guaranteed-benefits/maximum-
guarantee.html#2015.  The maximum monthly benefit is lower if a benefit will be 
paid to the retiree’s surviving spouse or other beneficiary upon the retiree’s death.  
Id. 
 82.  29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1), (7). 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  See 29 C.F.R. §§ 4022.24-.25. 
 85.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1322(a).   
 86.  See id.  
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Asset-funded benefits are nonguaranteed benefits that are 
payable from a terminated plan’s assets.87  The amount of a 
participant’s asset-funded benefits depends on how well-funded 
the plan was at the termination date.  Title IV provides a six-tier 
hierarchy for allocating assets among various categories of 
guaranteed and nonguaranteed benefits.88  The better funded 
the plan is as of the plan termination date and the higher the 
priority of the participant’s nonguaranteed benefit amounts, the 
greater the chance some or all of these amounts will be paid.89 
Lastly, PBGC pays section 1322(c) benefits.90  This 
provision enables a plan’s participants to share a portion of 
PBGC’s statutory claim for a plan’s unfunded benefit liabilities, 
a topic discussed below.91  These benefits are intended to cover a 
portion of participants’ unfunded nonguaranteed benefits.92 
 
B. PBGC AND PLAN TERMINATION 
When a pension plan covered under Title IV terminates 
without enough assets to pay its promised benefits, PBGC 
typically becomes the trustee of the plan and pays plan 
participants their pension benefits up to statutory limits 
described above.93  Title IV provides the exclusive means for a 
plan sponsor to terminate a single-employer pension plan.94  
This section will describe the methods by which a Title IV plan 
may terminate. 
1.  Voluntary Termination of Fully Funded Pension Plans 
A plan sponsor of a single-employer plan may generally 
elect to terminate a pension plan that has enough assets to pay 
 
 87.  29 U.S.C. § 1344(a).  PBGC’s regulations describe the sum of guaranteed 
benefits and asset-funded benefits as “Title IV benefits.”  29 C.F.R. § 4001.2. 
 88.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a). 
 89.  Whether a participant will receive asset-funded benefits (and the amount of 
such benefits) depends on whether the plan assets reach the participant’s 
nonguaranteed benefits in the asset-allocation hierarchy.  For example, benefits of 
participants who retired (or could have retired) more than three years before 
termination are entitled to priority; if the plan has enough assets, these benefits may 
be paid even if not guaranteed.  Id. § 1344(a)(3). 
 90.  Id. § 1322(c). 
 91.  Id. § 1362(b). 
 92.  Id. § 1362(b)(1)(A). 
 93.  See id. §§ 1321, 1322, 1361. 
 94.  Id. § 1341(a)(1); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 446 (1999). 
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all promised benefits.95  Commonly referred to as a standard 
termination, the process for terminating a fully funded plan is 
prescribed in detail by ERISA and PBGC’s regulations.96  There 
are several fundamental obligations that must be met to 
complete a standard termination.  First, the plan administrator 
must notify all participants, affected parties, and PBGC of its 
intent to terminate the plan.97  Second, the administrator must 
distribute plan assets to the plan participants98 either in the 
form of an annuity or a lump-sum payment.99  Finally, the 
administrator must certify to PBGC that all benefit liabilities 
have been paid.100 
If a plan administrator cannot locate a plan participant 
after a diligent search, it may either purchase an annuity in the 
participant’s name (and provide that information to PBGC) or 
transfer to PBGC the value of that participant’s benefit.101  
PBGC maintains a missing participant program and will pay 
participants who contact the agency seeking to collect their 
benefits or provide the name of the insurer from which their 
annuity was purchased.102 
PBGC is required to audit a statistically significant number 
of standard terminations each year to ensure statutory 
compliance.103  PBGC will also investigate a specific standard 
termination if it receives notice from a participant of an 
irregularity or otherwise has reason to believe that the plan may 
have been terminated improperly.104 
2. Voluntary Termination of Underfunded Pension Plans 
If a plan sponsor wants to terminate a single-employer 
pension plan that does not have enough assets to pay benefits 
 
 95.  29 U.S.C. § 1341(b). 
 96.  Id.; 29 C.F.R. §§ 4041.21-.31 (2014). 
 97.  29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(1)(A). 
 98.  Id. § 1341(b)(2)(D). 
 99.  Id. § 1341(b)(3)(A).  Unless the benefit is de minimis (under $5,000), or the 
participant elects a lump sum, the benefit must be paid as an annuity under an 
“irrevocable commitment” from an insurer.  Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(11)(A) 
(2012). 
 100.  29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(3)(B). 
 101.  Missing Participants, PBGC (Feb. 2, 2015), 
http://www.pbgc.gov/prac/terminations/missing-participants.html. 
 102.  Id.   
 103.  29 U.S.C. § 1303(a). 
 104.  Standard Terminations, PBGC (Feb. 2, 2015), 
http://www.pbgc.gov/prac/terminations/standard-terminations.html. 
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when due, it must satisfy the requirements for a distress 
termination.105  As the term suggests, a distress termination is 
permissible only in cases of severe financial hardship to the plan 
sponsor and each member of its “controlled group.”106  Although 
the exact meaning of “controlled group” is beyond the scope of 
this paper, a controlled group generally includes entities 
affiliated with the sponsor within prescribed degrees of 
ownership, such as an 80%-owned subsidiary.107  As in the case 
of a standard termination, the plan administrator is initially 
obligated to notify all affected parties, as well as PBGC, of its 
intent to terminate the plan.108  In addition, the administrator 
must provide information to PBGC sufficient to establish that 
the sponsor, and each of its controlled group members, meet at 
least one of four tests:109  (1) the “Liquidation Test,”110 (2) the 
“Reorganization Test,”111 (3) the “Business Continuation Test,”112 
or (4) the “Pension Costs Test.”113 
A plan sponsor meets the Liquidation Test if it has filed (or 
has had filed against it) a petition to liquidate its assets under 
the Bankruptcy Code or any similar federal or state insolvency 
proceeding, and the case has not, as of the plan termination 
date, been dismissed.114  The Reorganization Test requires a 
more searching analysis.  To satisfy this test, the plan sponsor 
must file (or have filed against it) a petition seeking 
reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code or any similar 
federal or state insolvency proceeding.115  The sponsor must then 
establish to the satisfaction of the bankruptcy court (or other 
appropriate court) that it “will be unable to pay all its debts 
pursuant to a plan of reorganization and will be unable to 
continue in business outside . . . the reorganization process” 
unless the pension plan is terminated.116  A more detailed 
analysis of these two tests follows in Part IV. 
In those instances where a distress termination is sought 
 
 105. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c). 
 106.  Id.  
 107.  Id. § 1301(a)(14); 29 C.F.R. § 4001.2 (2014). 
 108.  29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(1)(A). 
 109.  Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)-(C). 
 110.  Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(i). 
 111.  Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(ii). 
 112.  Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(iii). 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(i). 
 115.  Id. § 1342(c)(2)(B)(ii). 
 116.  Id.  
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outside bankruptcy or a similar insolvency proceeding, PBGC 
makes the initial determination whether the applicable test is 
met.117  Under the Business Continuation Test, PBGC 
determines whether a plan sponsor “will be unable to pay [its] 
debts when due and will be unable to continue in business” 
unless the pension plan is terminated.118  Under the Pension 
Costs Test, PBGC must determine that “the cost of providing 
pension coverage have become unreasonably burdensome . . . , 
solely as a result of a decline of the [plan sponsor’s] 
workforce.”119 
A plan sponsor and each member of its controlled group 
must meet at least one of the distress tests described above,120 
but each need not meet the same test.121  If one member of the 
controlled group does not meet the criteria for distress 
termination, PBGC will oppose termination.122  PBGC will also 
oppose a distress termination if the plan sponsor or a controlled 
group member is able to “top up” the plan and complete a 
standard termination.123 
3. Involuntary or PBGC-Initiated Termination of 
Underfunded Pension Plans 
A third way a pension plan can terminate is by an 
involuntary or PBGC-initiated termination.124  PBGC-initiated 
plan terminations can be mandatory or discretionary.125  ERISA 
requires that PBGC terminate a single-employer pension plan 
“as soon as practicable,” if the plan “does not have assets 
available to pay benefits which are currently due under the 
terms of the plan.”126  Put simply, if the plan runs out of money 
to pay current retirees, PBGC must terminate the plan. 
The four grounds for a discretionary PBGC-initiated 
termination are as follows: 
• “the plan has not met the minimum funding 
 
 117.  Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B). 
 118.  Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(iii)(I). 
 119.  Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(iii)(II). 
 120.  Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B). 
 121.  EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 1, at 9-41. 
 122.  Id. at 9-42. 
 123.  BEYER, supra note 8, at 38. 
 124.  29 U.S.C. § 1342. 
 125.  Id. § 1342(a).  
 126.  Id. 
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standard required under section 412 of [the 
IRC] . . .;”127 
• “the plan will be unable to pay benefits when 
due;”128 
• “the reportable event described in section 
1343(c)(7) has occurred;”129 or 
• “the possible long-run loss to the corporation 
with respect to the plan may reasonably be 
expected to increase unreasonably if the plan is 
not terminated.”130 
The three most common of these grounds are discussed in 
more detail in Part IV. 
C. LIABILITY TO PBGC UPON PLAN TERMINATION 
When an underfunded plan terminates,131 the Corporation 
will seek to collect certain liabilities from the sponsor and 
members of its controlled group. 
1.  Unfunded Benefit Liabilities (UBL) 
When a single-employer pension plan terminates, the plan 
sponsor is generally liable to PBGC for “the total amount of the 
unfunded benefit liabilities (as of the termination date) to all 
participants and beneficiaries under the plan,” plus interest 
from the termination date.132  The amount of UBL as of a certain 
date is “the excess (if any) of . . . the value of the benefit 
liabilities under the plan (determined as of such date on the 
basis of assumptions prescribed by the corporation . . . , over the 
current value (as of such date) of the assets of the plan.”133  
PBGC has issued regulations prescribing the mortality and 
interest assumptions to be used when calculating the amount of 
benefit liabilities.134  For clarity, PBGC often refers to UBL as 
 
 127.  Id. § 1342(a)(1). 
 128.  Id. § 1342(a)(2). 
 129.  Id. § 1342(a)(3).  This is a rarely invoked ground for termination involving 
certain distributions from a plan to a participant who is a “substantial owner.”  
Id. §§ 1321(d), 1343(c)(7). 
 130.  Id. § 1342(a)(4). 
 131.  See id. §§ 1341(c), 1342. 
 132.  Id. § 1362(a), (b). 
 133.  Id. § 1301(a)(18). 
 134.  29 C.F.R. §§ 4044.52-.53 (2014); 29 C.F.R. pt. 4044 App. B (2014).  
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the underfunding “on a termination basis.”135  This is a joint and 
several liability of the sponsor and each member of the sponsor’s 
controlled group.136 
2. Unpaid Minimum Funding Contributions 
The plan sponsor and members of its controlled group are 
also jointly and severally liable to the pension plan for 
contributions necessary to satisfy the minimum funding 
standards.137  When the pension plan is terminated, this liability 
is owed to PBGC as statutory trustee of the plan.138 
3. Unpaid Annual Premiums 
A plan sponsor and its controlled group members are jointly 
and severally liable to PBGC for any unpaid insurance 
premiums, interest, and penalties.139  This liability includes both 
the flat-rate and variable-rate premiums.140 
4. Termination Premium 
Under certain circumstances discussed in Part IV, the plan 
sponsor and members of its controlled group are jointly and 
severally liable for a termination premium.141  The premium is 
due to PBGC in three annual installments beginning with the 
first month after the pension plan terminates.142  The amount of 
each premium payment is equal to $1,250 multiplied by the 
number of participants in the plan immediately before the 
termination date.143 
III. BANKRUPTCY BASICS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Before delving into PBGC’s involvement in bankruptcy, we 
 
 135.  Liability pursuant to section 4062(3), 29 C.F.R. § 4062.8(b) (2013). 
 136.  29 U.S.C. § 1362(a). 
 137.  26 U.S.C. § 412(b)(2) (2012). 
 138.  29 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(1)(B)(ii). 
 139.  Id. § 1307(e). 
 140.  Id. § 1307. 
 141.  Id. § 1306(a)(7). 
 142.  Id. § 1306(a)(7)(C). 
 143.  Id. § 1306(a)(7)(A). 
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will first explore some basic concepts of bankruptcy law.  Article 
1, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution provides Congress with 
the authority to “establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of 
bankruptcies throughout the United States.”144  With that 
authority, Congress has enacted five major bankruptcy statutes: 
the Bankruptcy Acts of 1800, 1841, 1867, 1898,145 and the 
present law, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the 
Bankruptcy Code or Code). 
One major innovation of the Bankruptcy Code was Chapter 
11, which facilitated consensual reorganization to preserve the 
going-concern value of business debtors.146  The Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898 was mainly a creditor’s remedy focused on liquidation 
and distribution of the debtor’s estate, rather than rehabilitation 
or reorganization.147 
The main goals of bankruptcy law are to: (1) provide a fresh 
start for debtors and (2) promote equality of distribution among 
creditors.148 
B. FORMS OF BANKRUPTCY RELIEF 
The Bankruptcy Code provides two forms of relief for 
businesses: (1) liquidation under Chapter 7 and (2) 
reorganization under Chapter 11. 
In a liquidation under Chapter 7, a debtor generally gives 
up possession and control of all property owned at the time of 
the bankruptcy filing to the debtor’s estate.149  The debtor’s 
estate is then administered by a trustee who is a disinterested 
person appointed by a United States trustee from a panel of 
private trustees.150  The Chapter 7 trustee collects the debtor’s 
 
 144.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 145.  Bankruptcy Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 19; Bankruptcy Act of 1841, 5 Stat. 440; 
Bankruptcy Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 517; Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544.   
 146.  DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN 
AMERICA 161, 181 (Princeton Univ. Press 2001).  See Bank of Am. v. 203 N. LaSalle 
St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 457 (1999) (“[I]t was, after all, one of the Code’s innovations 
to narrow the occasions for courts to make valuation judgments, as shown by its 
preference for the supramajoritarian class creditor voting scheme in § 1126(c)”). 
 147.  1 WILLIAM MILLER COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 20.01 (Alan N. 
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2013). 
 148.  JEFFERY T. FERRIEL & EDWARD J. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 1 
(3rd ed. 2013) [hereinafter FERRIEL & JANGER]. 
 149.  Id. at 401.  Courts exempt some of the debtor’s possessions; nevertheless, 
the Chapter 7 process generally requires liquidation of the debtor’s assets to repay 
creditors. 
 150.  11 U.S.C. § 701 (2012).  A United States Trustee is a Department of Justice 
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property, converts that property to cash, submits a final report 
and accounting to the bankruptcy court, and makes distributions 
to creditors.151  At the end of this liquidation process, a Chapter 
7 debtor who is an individual may generally obtain a discharge 
from personal liability for certain prebankruptcy debts, and thus 
is given a “fresh start.”152  A business debtor, however, will not 
obtain a discharge under Chapter 7 because no business 
operations will remain post-bankruptcy.153 
Chapter 11 governs the reorganization of business entities.  
Chapter 11 creditors for the most part look to the debtor’s future 
earnings to satisfy their claims rather than to the debtor’s 
property at the time of bankruptcy filing.154  Businesses use 
Chapter 11 to restructure prepetition debt or rationalize their 
operations.155  Unlike Chapter 7, the debtor’s management in 
Chapter 11 usually continues to control the debtor’s property 
and business operations.  Such a debtor is known as a “debtor in 
possession.”156  The bankruptcy court may appoint a Chapter 11 
trustee, but typically only after a showing of fraud or gross 
mismanagement by the debtor’s current management.157  For 
simplicity, this paper will generally use the term “debtor” to 
include an appointed bankruptcy trustee. 
Chapter 11 requires the debtor to formulate an acceptable 
plan for payment or compromise of its prepetition debts.158  The 
plan must meet certain standards to be confirmed by the 
court.159  Depending on the facts and circumstances, however, 
the court may confirm a liquidating plan of reorganization, 
rather than a plan where the debtor emerges from bankruptcy 
as an operating entity.  Upon plan confirmation, the debtor 
generally receives a discharge of all debts that arose before 
confirmation (unless the debtor liquidates through Chapter 
 
official appointed for a judicial district who performs certain administrative and 
enforcement roles in connection with bankruptcy cases.  See id. § 307; 28 
U.S.C. §§ 581-89b (2012). 
 151.  See generally 11 U.S.C. § 704.  
 152.  See generally id. § 727; FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 455.   
 153.  See 11 U.S.C. § 727.   
 154.  FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 711.   
 155.  Troy A. McKenzie & Keith Sharfman, Basic Program:  Basic Concepts:  
Sources of Law, Structure of Code, Bankruptcy Courts, Legal Ethics and Estate 
Property, 092111 ABI-CLE 5, at 17 (2011) [hereinafter McKenzie & Sharfman].   
 156.  11 U.S.C. § 1101(1).   
 157.  Id. § 1104.   
 158.  Id. § 1106(a)(5).   
 159.  Id. § 1129.   
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11).160 
C. KEY BANKRUPTCY CONCEPTS 
Certain concepts are essential to understanding bankruptcy 
law.  Among the most important for our purposes are (1) 
property of the estate, (2) avoidance powers, (3) the automatic 
stay, (4) claims, and (5) executory contracts. 
1. Property of the Estate 
A bankruptcy case is commenced by the filing of a petition 
with the bankruptcy court.161  The filing may be either voluntary 
by the debtor or involuntary against the debtor by its 
creditors.162  Upon commencement of bankruptcy, a debtor’s 
property generally becomes “property of the estate,” which is 
available to satisfy creditors’ claims.163  Property of the estate is 
subject to court supervision.164  Property of the estate includes 
“all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case.”165  This broad definition includes 
not only tangible property interests, but contractually 
enforceable rights of the debtor at the time of bankruptcy 
filing.166 
The Code provides two main exceptions: (1) excluded 
property and (2) exempted property.167  Among the specific 
exclusions from property of the estate are educational savings 
accounts, tuition benefit funds, spendthrift trusts, and 
contributions to certain employee benefit funds and pension 
plans.168  Although exempted assets initially become property of 
the estate, the debtor may “exempt them back out of the 
 
 160.  Id. § 1141.  Under 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3), plan confirmation does not 
discharge the debtor if (1) the plan is a liquidating plan, (2) the debtor does not 
engage in business after consummation of the plan; and (3) the debtor would be 
denied a discharge in a liquidation case under section 727(a) of the Code. 
 161.  Id. §§ 301, 303. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  See id. § 541. 
 164.  DANIEL L. KEATING, BANKRUPTCY AND EMPLOYMENT LAW:  BANKRUPTCY'S 
IMPACT ON EMPLOYERS, EMPLOYEES, UNIONS, AND RETIREES 27 (1995) [hereinafter 
KEATING]. 
 165.  11 U.S.C. § 541(a).   
 166.  KEATING, supra note 164, at 27.   
 167.  11 U.S.C. §§ 522 (exemptions), 541(a)(1), (b), (c)(2) (exclusions); McKenzie & 
Sharfman, supra note 155, at 20. 
 168.  See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b). 
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estate.”169  Such exemptions give the debtor power to protect 
certain items of property from the reach of creditors.170  One 
complication is that while the Code lists a standard set of federal 
exemptions, states are permitted to opt out of the federal 
exemptions and to use state-enacted exemptions.171  Because 
most states have exercised this power, there is a wide disparity 
among the assets that may be exempted in the various states.172 
2. Avoidance Powers 
One concept closely related to the property of the estate is 
the debtor’s avoidance powers.  The power to “avoid” or unwind 
certain transactions enables a debtor to maximize the property 
of the estate for the benefit of creditors generally.173 
a. Strong-Arm Power 
The so-called “strong-arm” provision is designed to 
discourage secret liens.174  The debtor has the power to 
invalidate any secured creditor’s lien on the debtor’s property if 
it is unperfected as of the bankruptcy filing date.175  By 
exercising the strong-arm power, the debtor may transform an 
unperfected secured claim into a general unsecured claim for 
purposes of bankruptcy distribution.176 
b. Preferences 
Another power available to the debtor is to avoid 
“preferences.”177  The Code permits a debtor to recover certain 
transfers by the debtor to a creditor where payment on account 
of an antecedent debt occurred while the debtor was insolvent 
and within ninety days before the filing of the petition.178  One 
condition is that the transfer enabled the creditor to receive 
 
 169.  McKenzie & Sharfman, supra note 155, at 20. 
 170.  FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 402. 
 171.  Id. at 404. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  11 U.S.C. § 926. 
 174.  11 U.S.C. § 544.  See also KEATING, supra note 164, at 34. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. at 34-35.  See infra Section III.C.4. for a discussion of claims.   
 177.  11 U.S.C. § 547. 
 178.  Id. § 547(b)(4)(A).  
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more than it would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation.179  
In the case of transfers to an “insider,” the preference period 
may extend from 90 days to one year before the filing of the 
petition.180  This power prevents a debtor from rewarding one 
creditor at the expense of others, or one creditor from gaining 
unfair advantage over other creditors.  In effect, it bars creditors 
from exempting themselves from the bankruptcy process by 
receiving payment or collateral from the debtor on the eve of the 
filing.181 
c. Fraudulent Transfers 
The debtor also has the power to avoid certain transfers 
considered fraudulent.  In particular, the debtor may avoid 
“actually fraudulent” transfers—those made or incurred within 
two years of filing “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud” present or future creditors.182  In addition, a debtor 
may avoid “constructively fraudulent” transfers, including those 
it made while insolvent for less than equivalent value within two 
years before filing.183 
3. Automatic Stay 
To conduct an orderly bankruptcy proceeding, it is 
important to stop all efforts to collect from the debtor.184  
Otherwise, creditors would inevitably race to collect the debtor’s 
assets, which would quickly be dissipated.185  The automatic stay 
provides a debtor with protection from creditors’ collection 
efforts, including most forms of litigation.186  Upon the filing of a 
bankruptcy petition, the automatic stay immediately enjoins 
nearly all other proceedings and acts that affect the debtor or 
property of the debtor’s estate.187 
The automatic stay has certain enumerated exceptions, and, 
 
 179.  Id. § 547(b)(5)(A). 
 180.  Id. § 547(b)(4)(B).  Id. § 101(31) (defining the term “insider”). 
 181.  KEATING, supra note 164, at 34-35.  
 182.  11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A). 
 183.  Id. § 548(a)(1)(B). 
 184.  BARRY E. ADLER, DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, 
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 103-04 (4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter 
ALDER, BAIRD & JACKSON].  
 185.  Id.  
 186.  11 U.S.C. § 362.  
 187.  Id. 
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in some instances, the court may grant a party in interest relief 
from the stay.  A court may grant relief by conditioning, 
annulling, modifying, or completely terminating the automatic 
stay.188  In particular, creditors may seek relief from the 
automatic stay if they show “cause,” which can include a lack of 
adequate protection of an interest in property.189  The Code 
enumerates a variety of automatic stay exceptions, but the so-
called “police-powers” exception is especially relevant to PBGC 
and other government agencies.190  This exception—together 
with an express provision of ERISA that applies to “any 
bankruptcy”—exempts from the automatic stay an action by 
PBGC to initiate termination of a pension plan.191 
4. Claims 
Once the bankruptcy case commences and the automatic 
stay takes effect, the bankruptcy process dictates the resolution 
of all debts and determines the distribution each creditor will 
receive.192  Only creditors that have “claims” are eligible to 
receive distributions.193  Indeed, many issues in bankruptcy 
hinge upon which parties have a “claim.”194 
The Code defines “claim” as “any right to payment, whether 
or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, 
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured,” or a right to 
payment stemming from a “right to equitable remedy.”195  This 
broad definition, for example, encompasses PBGC’s contingent 
claims for termination liability when a plan sponsor or controlled 
group member files for bankruptcy, even if the plan has not 
terminated. 
Although the existence of a claim determines whether a 
creditor is eligible to receive a distribution, the type and 
seniority of the claim determines the amount and sequence of 
the creditor’s distribution.  The general distribution scheme in 
bankruptcy is as follows: (1) secured creditors first take the 
 
 188.  Id. § 362(d).  
 189.  Id. § 362(d)(1).  McKenzie & Sharfman, supra note 155, at 20. 
 190.  11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). 
 191.  29 U.S.C. § 1342(e) (2012). 
 192.  ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 184, at 141. 
 193.  FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 312.  
 194.  Id.  
 195.  11 U.S.C. § 101(5). 
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value of their security, (2) then administrative expenses and 
priority claims are paid, and (3) lastly general unsecured 
creditors receive any residue on a pro rata basis.196  Holders of 
equity interests generally have no “claim” and in practice rarely 
receive a distribution.197 
a. Secured Claims 
Whether a claim is secured is determined by nonbankruptcy 
law. Typically state law, such as Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code for security interests in personal property, 
determines such claim security.198  A creditor is secured only to 
the extent of the value of the collateral securing the claim.199  
Accordingly, if the value of the collateral is less than the amount 
of the claim, the amount of the deficiency is an undersecured 
claim.200  An undersecured claim is thus effectively two claims: 
one secured and one unsecured.201  If the collateral has value 
above the principal amount of the claim and expenses, 
postpetition interest is allowed.202  The court has discretion to 
determine the value in light of the valuation’s purpose and the 
proposed disposition or use of the property.203  For example, 
either liquidation value or going-concern value may be 
appropriate, depending on the type of collateral and other facts 
and circumstances.204 
b. Priority Claims 
The Code enumerates ten categories of unsecured expenses 
and claims that are entitled to priority in distribution.205  Among 
these types of expenses and claims are the following: first, 
priority for domestic support obligations; second, priority for 
“administrative expenses,” an especially important category 
discussed below; third priority for so-called “gap” claims in 
involuntary bankruptcy cases; fourth, priority for employee wage 
 
 196.  ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 184, at 11.   
 197.  11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(2), (7). 
 198.  McKenzie & Sharfman, supra note 155, at 18.   
 199.  11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1).   
 200.  Id.   
 201.  See FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 338.   
 202.  11 U.S.C. § 506(b).  See FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 341.   
 203.  11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1).  See FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 338-41.   
 204.  See McKenzie & Sharfman, supra note 155, at 18.   
 205.  11 U.S.C. § 507(a). 
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claims; fifth, priority for claims for certain contributions to 
employee benefit plans; and sixth, priority for certain claims of 
governmental units, also discussed below.206 
The second priority, or administrative expenses, includes 
“actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate,” 
such as wages and salaries of employees, and certain taxes 
incurred by the estate.207  “Administrative expenses” also include 
reasonable compensation for professional services rendered 
during the bankruptcy case.208  Administrative expenses are not 
technically “claims” because they did not arise prepetition.209  
Because administrative expenses in business bankruptcies are 
paid immediately after secured claims, creditors generally have 
an incentive to keep administrative expenses as low as 
possible.210  If the debtor has so few assets that administrative 
expenses cannot be paid in full, the estate is said to be 
“administratively insolvent.”211  Unless a potential investor 
arrives on the scene, an administratively insolvent debtor will 
generally shut down, and then liquidate.  In such a case, 
administrative expenses will be paid pro-rata and lower-ranked 
creditors will receive nothing.212  Likewise, if assets available for 
distribution run out in one of the lower priorities, then the 
creditors with higher priority claims will be paid in full.  
Creditors in the priority where the assets run out receive pro 
rata distributions, and creditors in lower priorities receive 
nothing.213 
To round out this discussion of priorities, the eighth priority 
governs certain claims of “governmental units,” mainly taxes.214  
In contrast to postpetition taxes, which are treated as 
administrative expenses, prepetition taxes are given eighth 
 
 206.  Id. § 507(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (8).  See McKenzie & Sharfman, supra note 
155, at 18.   
 207.  11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A), (B).   
 208.  Id. § 503(b)(4).   
 209.  See McKenzie & Sharfman, supra note 155, at 18.   
 210.  ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 184, at 11.   
 211.  11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(2), (b).   
 212.  See Robert J. Keach, et al., Concurrent Session: Business Track My Estate Is 
Administratively Insolvent: What Do I Do? What to Do When Your Case Turns Out 
Differently from How You Planned, 120111 ABI-CLE 223 at 2 (2011) (describing the 
designation as “administratively insolvent” as a condition in Chapter 11 
proceedings). 
 213.  ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 184, at 11.   
 214.  11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8); id. § 101(27) (defining “governmental unit”).   
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priority.215 
c. General Unsecured Claims 
General unsecured claims are claims that are not secured 
and do not have a priority.216  Creditors holding general 
unsecured claims receive a pro rata share of any assets 
remaining after distributions to secured claims, administrative 
expenses, and priority claims.217 
5. Executory Contracts 
The code does not define “executory contracts” even though 
it is an important concept. According to one widely accepted 
definition, a contract is executory if “the obligation of both the 
bankrupt and other party to the contract are so far unperformed 
that the failure of either to complete performance would 
constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the 
other.”218  For convenience, the term “executory contract” is used 
in this paper to include unexpired leases, which for the most 
part are handled like executory contracts.219  The Code gives the 
debtor three options for treatment of executory contracts: (1) 
rejection, (2) assumption, or (3) assignment.220 
If the debtor chooses to reject an executory contract, then 
rejection will be treated as if the debtor had breached the 
contract immediately before filing for bankruptcy.221  The party 
to the rejected contract therefore will have a claim for damages, 
which is usually unsecured.222  If the debtor assumes a contract, 
then the debtor binds the other party to future performance and 
also binds itself to cure any defaults under the contract.223  If a 
debtor assigns the contract, any proceeds from the assignment of 
the debtor’s rights under the contract become property of the 
estate.224  The trustee and estate are relieved from any liability 
 
 215.  Id. § 503(b)(2)(B)(i).  Id. § 507(a)(8).   
 216.  McKenzie & Sharfman, supra note 155, at 57.   
 217.  FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 355.   
 218.  KEATING, supra note 164, at 37 (quoting Vern Countryman, Executory 
Contracts in Bankruptcy, Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973)).   
 219.  11 U.S.C. § 365.   
 220.  Id. § 365 (a), (f).   
 221.  KEATING, supra note 164, at 37.   
 222.  Id.   
 223.  Id.   
 224.  Id. at 27.   
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for any breach of the executory contract that occurs after the 
assignment.225  The other party to the contract must look to the 
assignee for satisfaction of post-assignment obligations.226  
Although the debtor’s choice of how to treat an executory 
contract is subject to judicial approval, courts usually defer to 
the debtor’s decision.227 
The Code provides special rules for a Chapter 11 debtor to 
assume or reject collective bargaining agreements.228  Collective 
bargaining agreements are strikingly different from ordinary 
contracts in that they set out the relationship between 
management and labor, which is regulated by the National 
Labor Relations Board under the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA). 229  In an effort to accommodate labor policy,230 the Code 
prescribes strict standards and procedures that condition a 
debtor’s ability to modify or reject its collective-bargaining 
agreements upon the expiration of a set time period during 
which the debtor and union are “to confer in good faith in 
attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications.”231  If 
the parties fail to agree, the court may approve the debtor’s 
proposal.  But the court must first make certain findings, 
including that the modifications are “necessary” and that “the 
balance of equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement.”232  
Such proceedings are especially relevant to PBGC when debtors 
seek to modify collective-bargaining agreements that require 
them to maintain and fund a pension plan. 
There are also special rules under the Code for a Chapter 11 
 
 225.  11 U.S.C. § 365(k).   
 226.  Id.   
 227.  KEATING, supra note 164, at 38.   
 228.  11 U.S.C. § 1113.   
 229.  29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012); 1 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. 
NORTON III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:14 (3d ed. 2015) 
[hereinafter NORTON].  The NLRA regulates private-sector collective bargaining 
rights.   
 230.  Section 8(d) of the NLRA prohibits an employer from rejecting or modifying 
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement before its expiration date without first 
bargaining with the union.  See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).  More generally, under section 
8(a)(5) of the NLRA, it is illegal for an employer to “refuse to bargain” with the 
union.  See id. § 158(a)(5).   
 231.  11 U.S.C. § 1113(b).  See generally Daniel S Ehrenberg, Rejecting Collective 
Bargaining Agreements under Section 1113 of Chapter 11 of the 1984 Bankruptcy 
Code: Resolving the Tension Between Labor Law and Bankruptcy Law, 2 J.L. & POL’Y 
55, 59 (1994); John D. Ayer et al., The Intersection of Chapter 11 and Labor Law, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., May 2007, at 22; Andrew B. Dawson, Collective Bargaining 
Agreements in Corporate Reorganizations, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103 (2010).   
 232.  11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A), (c).   
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debtor to modify or not pay retiree insurance benefits.233  These 
procedures are generally limited to employer-sponsored medical, 
disability, or death benefits, and do not apply to pension 
benefits.234  The rules for modifying retiree insurance benefits 
have parallels to those for rejecting collective bargaining 
agreements, except that instead of a union, a committee of 
retired employees appointed by the court may serve as the 
authorized representative of retirees.235 
6. Discharge 
At the core of the “fresh start” objective of bankruptcy 
discussed above is the concept of discharge.  Whether granted at 
the end of an individual debtor’s Chapter 7 case or upon 
confirmation of a non-liquidating Chapter 11 plan, a discharge 
generally protects the debtor from any further liability on 
discharged debts.236  A discharge voids a judgment on discharged 
debts and enjoins any legal “action” to collect such a debt from 
the debtor or property of the debtor.237  A discharge also bars 
extrajudicial collection “acts” such as dunning letters or 
telephone calls to press for payment of discharged debts.238 
D. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 11 
Most of PBGC’s activity in bankruptcy is in Chapter 11 
cases.  A Chapter 11 case proceeds as follows.  First, a troubled 
company—but one with enough going-concern value to 
reorganize successfully—files a Chapter 11 petition.  The debtor 
continues to run its business and at the same time seeks to 
propose a plan of reorganization that divides the claims of 
creditors into various classes and prescribes a treatment for each 
class.  The debtor tries to negotiate key terms with important 
constituencies, including specific creditors and committees of 
creditors, in hopes of devising a comprehensive plan to which 
each claim class consents.  Finally, if the debtor succeeds, all 
claim classes will vote in favor of the plan and the court will 
confirm it.  The discussion below will briefly examine each of 
 
 233.  Id. § 1114.   
 234.  Id. § 1114(a).   
 235.  Id. § 1114(b), (c).   
 236.  See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 727, 1141(d).   
 237.  Id. § 524(a).   
 238.  See 3 NORTON, supra note 229, § 58:3.   
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these major phases. 
1. Commencement of a Case 
Like other bankruptcy proceedings, a Chapter 11 case 
commences with the filing of a petition.239  The commencement 
of a voluntary case constitutes an “order for relief” and triggers 
the automatic stay.240 As noted earlier, creditors may initiate 
bankruptcy through an involuntary petition.241  The Code 
generally permits an involuntary petition to be filed by three or 
more creditors who hold claims of a specified type and 
amount.242  If the debtor contests the involuntary filing, the 
creditors must show that the debtor was not generally paying its 
debts as the debts became due at the time of the filing.243 
The debtor must make a number of initial filings such as a 
list of creditors, a schedule of assets and liabilities, a schedule of 
current income and current expenditures, and a statement of 
financial affairs.244  Debtors typically obtain “first-day” orders on 
an ex parte basis.245  First-day orders may authorize the debtor 
to keep paying certain prepetition debts, such as utility 
payments and employee wages and benefits, and may also 
include approval of postpetition financing.246 Once the case 
commences, a number of other parties will play major roles—
some almost immediately, and others over time. 
a. Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) Lender 
The debtor’s ability to survive more than a few days in 
Chapter 11 usually depends on its ability to line up postpetition 
financing.  Ideally, before the filing of a petition, the debtor has 
negotiated preliminary financial terms with a lender to finance 
the debtor’s postpetition operations for some specified period of 
time.  Subject to objection by creditors, the court will decide 
whether or not to approve the DIP-financing package.247  Failure 
to obtain any DIP financing nearly always leads to rapid 
 
 239.  11 U.S.C. § 301(a). 
 240.  Id. §§ 301(b), 362. 
 241.  Id. § 303. 
 242.  Id. § 303(b)(1). 
 243.  Id. § 303(h).   
 244.  Id. § 521(a).  See also FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 176.   
 245.  See 1 NORTON, supra note 229, § 3:14.   
 246.  Id.   
 247.  11 U.S.C. § 364.   
16.2 GOLDOWITZ_MACRO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/15  10:29 AM 
2015] THE PBGC WINS A CASE 289 
liquidation. 
b. Committees 
Also shortly after the petition is filed, the United States 
trustee appoints a committee of unsecured creditors.248  
Typically an unsecured creditors’ committee consists of the seven 
largest creditors.249  Committee members must be 
“representative of the different kinds of claims.”250  The United 
States trustee may also appoint other committees to represent 
secured creditors and equity holders if appropriate.251  Because 
it would be impractical for a debtor to negotiate separately with 
hundreds or thousands of creditors, committees play a major role 
in formulating  a plan of reorganization and sometimes in 
litigating major controversies.252  Unsecured creditors’ 
committee members have a fiduciary duty to the unsecured 
creditor body.253 
c. Potential Sources of Exit Financing 
To emerge from bankruptcy, the debtor must find a way to 
finance its reorganization plan.  The DIP lender is often a 
leading candidate for exit financing, but the package will have to 
be negotiated and approved by the court as part of a 
reorganization plan.  A competing lender, possibly one favored 
by the unsecured creditors’ committee, may vie for this role.  The 
unsecured creditors themselves—perhaps by accepting a smaller 
cash distribution on their claims in early postpetition years in 
favor of a potentially greater cash recovery in later years, or by 
agreeing to convert their debt holdings into equity in the 
reorganized debtor—may be a major source of financing.  
Employee groups may be asked to make wage concessions.  Key 
suppliers may be asked for future price discounts.  An outside 
investor may also play a pivotal role. 
 
 248.  Id. § 1102(a)(1).   
 249.  Id. § 1102(b)(1).   
 250.  Id.   
 251.  See id. § 1102(a)(1), 1 NORTON, supra note 229, § 3:14.   
 252.  ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 184, at 679.   
 253.  See 5 NORTON, supra note 229, § 98:36.   
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2. The Plan of Reorganization 
At the heart of the Chapter 11 reorganization process is the 
plan of reorganization.  To expand somewhat on our earlier 
overview, the plan of reorganization process is as follows: (1) the 
debtor (or any “party in interest” under certain conditions)254 
proposes a plan of reorganization; (2) the claims of the creditors 
and the interest of the shareholders are then placed in classes; 
(3) each class votes on the plan; (4) if all classes accept the plan 
and the plan satisfies other Chapter 11 requirements, then the 
court confirms the plan, or if a class dissents, then the court 
confirms the plan only if the plan is fair and equitable and does 
not discriminate unfairly; and (5) once the plan is confirmed, the 
debtor obtains a discharge from debts that arose before 
confirmation.255 
a. First Stage: Proposal of Plan of Reorganization 
One of a debtor’s major advantages is the exclusive right to 
file a plan for the first 120 days of the case.256  After expiration 
of the debtor’s exclusivity period—which may be extended up to 
18 months after the order for relief—any party in interest may 
propose a plan.  Multiple competing plans may proceed to a 
confirmation hearing simultaneously.257 
Debtors negotiate with the committees and other key 
constituents throughout the plan process because a consensual 
plan is often the quickest and cleanest way to confirmation.258  
In many cases, senior creditors give up value to junior classes to 
achieve a consensus, and recoveries may improve generally if 
major claims and controversies are settled rather than litigated 
to finality.259 
b. Second Stage: Classification of Claims 
Classification of claims is critical in formulating a plan as it 
 
 254.  A “party in interest” is defined to include “the debtor, the trustee, a 
creditors’ committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity 
security holder, or any indenture trustee.”  11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2012).   
 255.  ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 184, at 675.   
 256.  11 U.S.C. § 1121(b).  KEATING, supra note 164, at 39.   
 257.  11 U.S.C § 1129(c).   
 258.  ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 184, at 681.   
 259.  Id.   
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can affect who gets what under the plan, and also directly affects 
confirmation if any degree of creditor dissent is expected.260  A 
plan must classify claims and provide the “same treatment” for 
all claims within a class, unless the claimant agrees to less 
favorable treatment.261  The Code governs classification of claims 
and provides that a plan may only place a claim in a particular 
class if it is “substantially similar” to other claims of such 
class.262 
c. Third Stage: Voting on Plan 
After the debtor proposes a plan, the debtor must then try 
to get the plan accepted.263  To do this, the debtor must first 
submit a disclosure statement for court approval.264  A disclosure 
statement explains the plan to those who must vote on it, and is 
reviewed by the court to ensure that it contains “adequate 
information.”265  “Adequate information is information “of a 
kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable” 
to enable a “hypothetical investor” to make “an informed 
judgment about the plan.”266 
Once the court approves the disclosure statement, the next 
step is to solicit votes for plan acceptance.  Creditors vote on 
whether to approve a plan, with two key exceptions.  First, any 
holder of a claim or interest that is not “impaired” is deemed to 
have accepted the plan and no solicitation of such holder is 
required.267  Second, a class that is to receive nothing under the 
plan is deemed to have rejected the plan and again no 
solicitation of such class is required.268  For classes that vote, at 
least two-thirds in amount of claims and more than one-half in 
number of claimants must vote in favor of the plan for the plan 
to be accepted by that class.269 
 
 260.  KEATING, supra note 164, at 40-41.  
 261.  11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4).   
 262.  Id. § 1122.   
 263.  FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 760.   
 264.  11 U.S.C. § 1125.   
 265.  Id. § 1125(b); FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 760-61.   
 266.  11 U.S.C. § 1125(a).   
 267.  Id. §§ 1124, 1126(f).   
 268.  Id. § 1126(g).   
 269.  ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 184, at 698; see also 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 1126(c), 1129(a)(8).   
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d. Fourth Stage: Confirmation of Plan 
In addition to the voting classes’ acceptance of the plan, the 
court must confirm the plan after a hearing.270  To confirm a 
plan, the court must find the following: that the plan complies 
with applicable provisions of the Code; has been proposed in 
good faith; discloses the identity and salaries of officers, 
directors, and certain others; and has been either accepted by 
voting class or satisfies the “cramdown” rule (to be discussed 
below).271  Another requirement for confirmation is called the 
“best-interests-of-creditors” test.  It requires: that each holder of 
a claim or interest in an impaired class either (i) has accepted 
the plan, or (ii) receives as much under the plan as it would have 
received in a Chapter 7 liquidation.272  This test applies to each 
individual creditor, including dissenting members of a class that 
approved the plan.273  Still another standard to be met for plan 
confirmation is “feasibility”: that the debtor can carry out the 
terms of the plan and will likely not liquidate or need further 
financial reorganization after confirmation unless the plan 
proposes such liquidation or reorganization.274 
For the plan to be confirmed, each impaired class must 
accept the plan by the requisite majority vote.275  For a 
nonconsensual plan, however, the Code provides an exception 
called the cramdown rule.276  A nonconsensual plan may be 
confirmed if, among other things, the plan is “fair and equitable” 
and does not “discriminate unfairly.”277  The central concept 
behind this exception is the so-called “absolute priority” rule: 
that senior classes must be paid in full before any junior classes 
may receive any distribution.278  If a dissenting class is not paid 
in full, no class junior to the dissenting class may receive a 
distribution.279  Accordingly, a class of unsecured claims that is 
not paid in full may be crammed down as long as stockholders 
 
 270.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a).   
 271.  Id. § 1129(a)(1), (3), (5), (8); see also id. § 1129(b) (“cramdown” provision).   
 272.  Id. § 1129(a)(7).   
 273.  Id.    
 274.  Id. § 1129(a)(11).   
 275.  Id. §§ 1126(d), 1129(a)(8).   
 276.  Id. § 1129(b); KEATING, supra note 164, at 41.   
 277.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). 
 278.  FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 780-81; ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON, 
supra note 184, at 681.   
 279.  FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 789.   
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receive no distribution.280  Further, although the cramdown 
approach does not require acceptance by all classes, acceptance 
by at least one impaired class is still required.281  Although 
cramdown is an option for a nonconsensual plan, the risk of a 
contested confirmation hearing usually makes a consensual plan 
the preferred course.282 
e. Final Stage: Discharge Postconfirmation 
Once a plan is confirmed, the debtor carries out the plan 
according to its terms and discharges all debts that arose before 
confirmation except where the plan provides otherwise.283  The 
plan and its confirmation order are binding on the debtor and 
any creditor, equity security holder, or general partner in the 
debtor “whether or not such creditor, equity security holder, or 
general partner has accepted the plan.”284  Accordingly, a 
confirmed plan has res judicata effect in any claim dispute.285 
3. Asset Sales 
Chapter 11 is mainly designed for business reorganization, 
but debtors are increasingly using it to facilitate the sale of all or 
substantially all their assets.286  Commonly, debtors seek to sell 
their assets through a process known as a “Section 363 sale,” 
where a debtor may obtain court approval to sell property of the 
estate “other than in the ordinary course of business.”287  This is 
to be distinguished from the use, sale, or lease of property of the 
estate “in the ordinary course of business,” which may generally 
take place without notice or a hearing.288  Asset sales under 
Chapter 11 allow debtors to maintain control of the business 
operations and to sell their assets as a going concern, which 
generally results in a higher sale price.289  Another attractive 
 
 280.  Id.   
 281. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1);  see also  KEATING, supra note 164, at 41-42.   
 282.  Id. at 17.   
 283.  11 U.S.C. § 1141(d).   
 284.  Id. § 1141(a).   
 285.  FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 800-01.   
 286.  Douglas E. Deutsch & Michael G. Distefano, The Mechanics of a § 363 Sale, 
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2011, at 48 [hereinafter Deutsch & Distefano].  
 287.  11 U.S.C. § 363(b).   
 288.  Id. § 363(c).   
 289.  See Deutsch & Distefano, supra note 286, at 48; Felton E. Parrish, Jo Ann J. 
Brighton & James E. Morgan, Sales of Assets Under Section 363, in COLLIER GUIDE 
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reason to sell assets under Chapter 11 is that the Code permits 
buyers to purchase assets “free and clear of any interest in such 
property” as long as certain conditions are met.290 
The Code allows a debtor to complete a section 363 sale 
after notice and a hearing.291  Such sales generally occur through 
a public auction process.292  First, the debtor will attempt to find 
a “stalking-horse bidder” (one who sets the floor value through 
an opening bid).293  Once the debtor either (1) agrees to a 
purchase agreement with the stalking-horse bidder, or (2) in the 
absence of a stalking-horse bidder, is ready to market the assets 
for sale, the debtor asks the court to approve a set of bidding 
procedures. 294 
A court’s decision on bidding procedures is based on the 
following: whether the procedures will maximize the sale price, 
are necessary and made in good faith, and are beneficial to 
creditors.295  The debtor may seek protections for a stalking-
horse bidder such as breakup fees (payments to a potential 
purchaser in the event the transaction does not close), bidder 
qualifications (minimum requirements for potential purchasers 
to submit alternate bids), or overbid requirements (a minimum 
amount by which a subsequent bid must exceed the prior bid).296  
If another bidder ends up winning the competition, then such 
protections compensate the stalking-horse bidder for the costs of 
assuming that role.  Bidding procedures also include a period for 
the debtor to approach other prospective buyers, a period for any 
interested parties in purchasing the assets to conduct due 
diligence, and a deadline for submitting additional bids.297 
If interested parties (other than the stalking-horse bidder) 
timely submit bids, the debtor usually holds an auction where 
each of the bidders can increase their respective bids.  At the end 
of the auction, the debtor selects the winning bidder and seeks 
court approval of the sale.298  Often, the possibility of objections 
to the sale and the complexity of the terms of some bids require 
 
TO CHAPTER 11:  KEY TOPICS AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES § 3.02 (Alan N. Resnick & 
Henry J. Sommer eds.).   
 290.  11 U.S.C. § 363(f).   
 291.  Id. § 363(b)(1).   
 292.  Deutsch & Distefano, supra note 286, at 48.   
 293.  Id.   
 294.  Id.   
 295.  Id.   
 296.  Id.   
 297.  Id.   
 298.  Id.   
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a searching analysis by the court. 
IV. PBGC’S ROLE IN BANKRUPTCY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One approach to examining PBGC’s experience in 
bankruptcy would be to begin by discussing statistics on the 
number of active bankruptcies in which the agency participated 
in select years of its history.  For example, in 2014, PBGC was 
involved in 319 active bankruptcy and state-receivership cases, 
the great majority of which were bankruptcy proceedings.299  But 
a more practical introduction might be to illustrate favorable 
and unfavorable outcomes for PBGC in bankruptcy with 
anecdotes from two actual cases under Chapter 11.  These 
examples are at the extremes.  Most cases involve more routine 
rescues, or more routine abandonments, of a debtor’s pension 
plan. 
1. A Favorable Outcome: American Airlines 
When companies enter bankruptcy, PBGC first seeks to 
preserve their plans if possible—as in the case of American 
Airlines.  American and its parent, AMR Corporation, “entered 
bankruptcy in November 2011 and immediately announced 
plans to terminate American’s four pension plans for its 130,000 
workers and retirees.”300  In response, PBGC worked with the 
airline, its unions, and other creditors to show the airline that it 
could afford to maintain its pension plans.301  American’s plans 
were underfunded by $12 billion.302  In 2012, the airline agreed 
with PBGC and moved to freeze, rather than terminate, its 
pension plans.303  Throughout 2012 and 2013, PBGC 
collaborated with unions, the company, and others to help 
resolve many issues.  One such issue was elimination of a lump-
 
 299.  See 2014 PBGC ANN. REP., supra note 14, at 95.  “Case” is defined here to 
count only the bankruptcy of the pension plan’s sponsor, not every affiliated company 
that may file a separate petition.   
 300.  See 2013 PBGC ANN. REP. ii, 12, available at 
http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/2013-annual-report.pdf.   
 301.  Id.   
 302.  Id.   
 303.  Jerry Geisel, American Airlines Freezes its Pension Plans, WORKFORCE.COM 
(Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.workforce.com/articles/american-airlines-freezes-its-
pension-plans.   
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sum option in the plan covering American’s pilots, which is an 
unusual event discussed later in this paper.304  AMR’s proposed 
plan of reorganization involved a merger with US Airways.  In 
August 2013, the Department of Justice brought a civil action 
under federal antitrust law to enjoin the planned merger.305  The 
suit was settled in a way that allowed the merger and permitted 
AMR to emerge from bankruptcy in December 2013, with the 
pension plans frozen but not terminated.306 
2. An Unfavorable Outcome: Friendly Ice Cream 
In October 2011, Friendly Ice Cream Corporation and its 
subsidiaries, a retail restaurant chain, filed for bankruptcy.307  
Sun Capital private equity funds had acquired Friendly in a 
leveraged buyout.308  Sun Capital created the capital structure, 
appointed the company’s managers, and provided financing 
before bankruptcy and through DIP financing during the 
bankruptcy.309  Shortly after filing for bankruptcy,310 the debtors 
filed a motion to sell substantially all their assets to another Sun 
Capital affiliate.  The latter declined to assume the pension 
plan.311  The proposed buyer submitted a “credit bid” at the sale, 
which is a practice whereby a secured creditor bids for property 
of the estate using the debt it is owed to offset the purchase 
 
 304.  Edward Thomas Veal, IRS Allows Elimination of Lump Sum Distributions 
as an Alternative to Termination of Bankrupt Employer’s Underfunded Pension Plan, 
ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL: LEXOLOGY (Nov. 29, 2012), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8612bf14-5ed2-46a0-a310-
e98da6917c5f.   
 305.  Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Requires US Airways and 
American Airlines to Divest Facilities at Seven Key Airports to Enhance System-wide 
Competition and Settle Merger Challenge (Nov. 12, 2013), JUSTICE.GOV, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-us-airways-and-american-
airlines-divest-facilities-seven-key.   
 306.  Jack Nicas & Brent Kendall, Big Airline Merger Is Cleared to Fly: AMR, US 
Airways Agree to Limited Concession in Settlement with U.S., WALL STREET J. (Nov. 
13, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304644104579193804169829002; see 
2014 PBGC ANN. REP. 6, supra note 14.   
 307.  Hon. Joshua Gotbaum, ABI Commission to Study Reform of Chapter 11: 
Statement of Hon. Joshua Gotbaum, 4 (Mar. 14, 2013), 
http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/Gotbaum-ABI-Statement.pdf. [hereinafter Gotbaum 
Statement].   
 308.  Id.   
 309.  Id.   
 310.  Id.   
 311.  Id.   
16.2 GOLDOWITZ_MACRO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/15  10:29 AM 
2015] THE PBGC WINS A CASE 297 
price.312  In December 2011, less than three months after 
Friendly entered bankruptcy and before the debtors proposed 
any reorganization plan, the court approved the sale.313  Faced 
with what would soon be an abandoned pension plan left behind 
with a liquidating corporate shell, PBGC reluctantly took steps 
to terminate it.314  Active and retired participants suffered a loss 
of half a million dollars in nonguaranteed benefits.315  PBGC 
assumed unfunded benefit liabilities of $115 million.  To pave 
the way for court approval, Sun Capital paid a modest amount to 
settle litigation brought by PBGC and the unsecured creditors’ 
committee in opposition to the sale.316 
B. CREDITORS’ COMMITTEES AND PBGC PARTICIPATION 
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code in 1994 to 
expressly allow a pension guarantor (i.e., PBGC) to be a member 
of a creditors’ committee.317  Before the amendment, some 
United States trustees took the position that appointment of 
PBGC to a creditors’ committee was impermissible, or at least 
inappropriate.  Because PBGC often holds the largest unsecured 
claims in a bankruptcy, the agency typically cites its strong 
interest in the fiscal integrity and successful reorganization of 
the debtor as a rationale for appointment.  The agency also 
typically highlights its specialized knowledge in employee 
benefits, labor, administrative law, and taxation as useful 
expertise to contribute to the committee and bankruptcy process.  
Although PBGC membership on creditors’ committees is now 
commonplace and advantageous to the agency, it does not 
become a committee member in every case.  Because PBGC’s 
resources are limited, it must be selective in choosing cases in 
which to seek committee membership. 
C. PLAN TERMINATION IN BANKRUPTCY 
The reason for PBGC’s involvement in bankruptcy is nearly 
 
 312.  See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 
2069 (2012).   
 313.  Mike Spector, Two Hats a Fit for Friendly’s Owner, WALL ST. J. (July 27, 
2012), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443477104577551000555121714. 
 314.  Id.   
 315.  Id.   
 316.  Id.   
 317.  11 U.S.C. §§ 101(41)(B), 1102(b) (2012).   
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always the debtor’s sponsorship of an underfunded pension plan.  
Especially for small debtors, the pension plan is often far down 
the list of concerns early in the case.  PBGC will typically send a 
“shot-across-the-bow” letter to debtor’s counsel with the aim of 
reminding the sponsor and plan administrator of their 
responsibilities for funding and maintaining the plan, including 
the strict criteria for terminating an underfunded plan.  After 
some months, most debtors will have begun to focus on the 
future of the plan.  In many cases, there is little question that 
the plan is affordable, and it will “ride through” the bankruptcy.  
The debtor may also favor continuing the plan as a tool to retain 
valued employees who may be tempted to look for new jobs 
rather than risk staying with a company in bankruptcy.  
Alternatively, maintaining the plan may be required by a 
collective bargaining agreement.  Even if the debtor takes steps 
in bankruptcy to reject its agreement,318 it may be unsuccessful, 
or the pension plan may be preserved as part of a settlement.  
On the other hand, the debtor, certain creditors, or potential 
investors may see bankruptcy as an opportunity to rid the 
company of “legacy costs,” which may include pensions. 
Throughout a reorganization, PBGC considers whether the 
interests of its insurance program, premium payers, and 
participants are better served by plan continuation or plan 
termination.  While plan continuation is the preferred outcome, 
if PBGC believes the plan sponsor will be so weak after exiting 
Chapter 11 that it will not survive, PBGC may consider 
termination to cut its losses. 
1. Distress Termination 
Most plan sponsors who seek distress terminations do so in 
the context of a bankruptcy proceeding. 
a. Liquidation 
In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy of the plan sponsor, generally 
the pension plan terminates.  Applying the Liquidation Test is 
usually straightforward.319  This assumes, of course, that there 
is no member of the sponsor’s controlled group still in business.  
If a court in a Chapter 11 case approves a liquidating plan of 
reorganization for members of the controlled group, PBGC 
 
 318.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1113. 
 319.  29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(i) (2012). 
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generally interprets the statutory test the same way as in 
Chapter 7 liquidation. 
b. Reorganization 
As discussed above, a distress termination involving a plan 
sponsor seeking to reorganize in bankruptcy requires a 
determination by the bankruptcy court.320  At the very least, the 
debtor will have to submit declarations and documentary 
evidence and perhaps face a contested hearing.  All controlled 
group members must demonstrate distress, because all 
controlled group members are liable for minimum funding 
contributions. 
In practice, the debtor must show that its projected cash 
flow will be inadequate to support projected minimum funding 
contributions.  The standard has been characterized as a “but 
for” test.321  More precisely, the court must determine whether 
the debtor “will be unable to pay all its debts pursuant to a plan 
of reorganization and will be unable to continue in business 
outside the chapter 11 reorganization process.”322  As one court 
explained: “The reference in the statute to ‘a’ plan of 
reorganization does not permit a distress termination simply 
because a particular plan requires it; rather the test is whether 
the debtor can obtain confirmation of any plan of reorganization 
without termination of the retirement plan.”323  Relevant factors 
include whether the debtor has considered benefit freezes and 
other measures to reduce costs, trimmed other fixed costs, and 
identified discretionary spending.324 
Distress terminations often turn on testimony as to the 
feasibility of the debtor’s obtaining exit financing or an equity 
infusion if the pension plan were to continue.  For example, one 
court approved a distress termination after being persuaded that 
the debtor would be unable, after debt service, to meet minimum 
funding requirements even if it devoted its entire “free cash 
flow” to the plan for three years after confirmation.  In the 
court’s view, it was not plausible that the debtor would attract 
post-confirmation financing or an equity investment.325  By 
 
 320.  Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(ii)(IV). 
 321.  In re Resol Mfg. Co., 110 B.R. 858, 861-62 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 322.  29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(ii)(IV). 
 323.  In re US Airways Group, 303 B.R. 784, 798 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003). 
 324.  See In re US Airways Group, 296 B.R. 734, 745 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003). 
 325.  In re Wire Rope Corp., 287 B.R. 771, 780-81 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2002). 
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contrast, another court rejected a debtor’s argument that plan 
termination was necessary merely because it insisted that a 
proposed investor would not close on a transaction if the pension 
plan were not terminated.326  After the court considered the 
parties’ negotiating history and what it termed “existential 
financial realities,” it concluded that “the pension terminations 
were not necessary even though they were desired by the 
[i]nvestor.”327  In yet another case, where the only investor to 
submit a full and credible proposal to invest made termination of 
the pension plan a condition of its investment, the bankruptcy 
court approved the termination.328 
Bankruptcies where a debtor sponsors multiple pension 
plans present another wrinkle.  Financial projections may show 
that the debtor could afford to fund some, but not all, of its 
pension plans.  A recent controversy concerns whether, in such 
cases, the bankruptcy court’s analysis should be based on a plan-
by-plan versus an aggregate approach.  PBGC has interpreted 
ERISA to require the court to look at the affordability of plans 
one by one, that is, not considering the affordability of other 
plans.  Some courts have disagreed, holding that where a debtor 
proposes multiple distress terminations, ERISA and “equitable” 
principles of bankruptcy preclude a bankruptcy court from 
favoring one group of workers over another by permitting some 
plans to be terminated while others continue.329  The legal and 
policy questions are deep.  As one court acknowledged in ruling 
against the agency, “We are not unsympathetic to [PBGC’s] 
view.  There is undoubtedly a tension between treating similarly 
situated workers alike and doing the least that is necessary for 
the company to emerge from bankruptcy.”330 
2. PBGC-Initiated Termination 
Sometimes debtors, especially smaller ones, make no effort 
 
 326.  Id. 
 327. In re Philip Servs. Corp., 310 B.R. 802, 808 (2004) (Icahn-affiliated lender 
fails to establish grounds for distress termination).  
 328. In re Aloha Airgroup, Inc., Nos. 04-3063, 1524, 1629, 2005 WL 3487724, *2 
(Bankr. D. Haw. Dec. 13, 2005), vacated as moot, Nos. 05-00777 JMS/BMK, 05-00778 
JMS/KSC, 05-00778 JMS/KSC, 05-00779 JMS/BMK, 2006 WL 695054 (D. Haw. Mar. 
13, 2006). 
 329. In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2006).  Accord PBGC v. 
Falcon Prods., Inc. (In re Falcon Prods, Inc.), 354 B.R. 889 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d on 
other grounds, 497 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2007).   
 330. Kaiser, 456 F.3d at 342.   
16.2 GOLDOWITZ_MACRO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/15  10:29 AM 
2015] THE PBGC WINS A CASE 301 
to terminate a plainly unaffordable pension plan.  Not only may 
the debtor be distracted by more immediate pressures, but 
applying for a distress termination requires it to incur more 
professional fees.  In other instances, a collective bargaining 
agreement stands in the way of a distress termination.  The 
union may resist plan termination as long as possible.  The 
debtor’s management may either be unwilling to face the facts 
about projected funding costs, or may fear a strike or costly court 
proceeding to reject its collective bargaining agreement, even 
when it recognizes the plan’s unaffordability.  In such cases, 
where PBGC is persuaded that termination is inevitable, the 
agency may initiate termination.331  This procedure is often 
carried out by a written agreement between PBGC and the plan 
administrator that terminates the plan and appoints the agency 
as statutory trustee.332  Termination by agreement takes place 
out of court.  Moreover, the existence of a collective bargaining 
agreement whose terms prohibit the employer from seeking a 
distress termination does not bar PBGC from initiating 
termination.333  Of course, the plan administrator may decline to 
sign a termination agreement with PBGC. If so, the agency files 
an action in the appropriate United States district court—not 
the bankruptcy court—to seek a decree of plan termination.334 
The grounds for PBGC-initiated termination most relevant 
to bankruptcy are the following: (1) the plan has failed to meet 
the minimum funding standard, (2) the plan will be unable to 
pay benefits when due, or (3) PBGC’s long-run loss may 
reasonably be expected to increase unreasonably.335  The most 
common of these three grounds is the second.  One court 
interpreted that criterion as follows: “[T]he test is not 
affordability, but rather whether the plan will be ‘unable to pay 
benefits when due.’ . . .The latter standard encompasses a range 
of factors that permit the exercise of discretion by the agency, 
whereas the concept of affordability within a § 1341 bankruptcy 
proceeding is far more demanding.”336 
Although the test of “will be unable to pay benefits when 
 
 331.  In re UAL Corp. (Pilots’ Pension Plan Termination), 468 F.3d 444, 451-52 
(7th Cir. 2006).    
 332.  29 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3); id. § 1342(c)(1)(penultimate sentence). 
 333.  Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(3) with 29 U.S.C. § 1342.   
 334.  Id. § 1342(b)(1).    
 335.  Id. § 1342(a)(1), (2), (4).   
 336.  Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA v. PBGC, No. Civ. A. 05-1036ESH, 2006 
WL 89829, at 11 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2006) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2)).   
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due” may be the most often cited rationale for a PBGC-initiated 
termination, the alternative “long-run loss” ground can be an 
important check against moral hazard.337  For example, PBGC 
has successfully terminated plans in advance of a controlled-
group breakup, where a transaction threatened to permit a 
financially strong company to escape liability for underfunding 
and leave behind a financially troubled sponsor.338  Likewise, the 
agency succeeded in terminating plans to prevent additional 
losses from springing shutdown benefits agreed upon between 
the debtor and its union.339  In another case, the court upheld a 
prompt PBGC-initiated termination to prevent six months of 
further benefit accruals that would have resulted from a 
compromise reached between the debtor and its union in the 
context of an inherently unsustainable plan.340  In each example, 
the court upheld PBGC action to stop conduct by private-sector 
actors that would have harmed the agency and its premium 
payers. 
D. TREATMENT OF PBGC CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY 
In a best-case scenario, the debtor reorganizes successfully, 
the pension plan continues, and PBGC has no claims in 
bankruptcy.  Instead, when the plan terminates, PBGC 
vigorously pursues recovery. 
1. Unfunded Benefit Liabilities 
PBGC’s largest claim is typically its claim for unfunded 
benefit liabilities (UBL).341  Under ERISA, if a liable party fails 
to pay the claim after demand, then a lien arises in favor of 
 
 337.  A leading treatise on pension plans explains:  “The existence of the U.S. 
pension insurance system introduces an element of moral hazard.  If pensions are 
guaranteed . . . , participants have less incentive to be vigilant in monitoring the 
plan.  Guarantees of benefit payments . . . also give workers greater incentive to 
exchange future promises of pension payments for current wages.”  MCGILL, supra 
note 59, at 200. 
 338.  PBGC v. FEL Corp., 798 F. Supp. 239 (D.N.J. 1992).   
 339.  PBGC v. Republic Techs. Int’l, LLC, 386 F.3d 659 (6th Cir. 2004).   
 340.  In re UAL Corp. (Pilots’ Pension Plan Termination), 468 F.3d 444, 451-52 
(7th Cir. 2006).  The court rejected PBGC’s view that the decision to terminate was 
agency action subject to limited review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 706 (2012), but upheld the decision on independent review.  468 F.3d at 449-
52.   
 341.  29 U.S.C. § 1362(b).   
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PBGC as of the termination date of the plan.342  The amount of 
the lien is limited to 30% of the collective net worth of all liable 
parties.343  For purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, the lien is 
“treated in the same manner as a tax due and owing to the 
United States.”344  In practice, the plan sponsor almost 
invariably enters bankruptcy before the conditions are met, and 
the attachment of a lien—let alone its perfection—is barred by 
the automatic stay.345  Thus, the UBL claim is almost always 
unsecured. 
Somewhat more likely is the possibility that part or all of 
the UBL claim may be accorded priority treatment.  PBGC’s 
position is that the claim is an administrative expense entitled 
to priority as a tax incurred by the estate, in an amount up to 
30% of the controlled group’s collective net worth.346  
Independently, the claim may meet the definition of a “tax” for 
bankruptcy purposes because it is an involuntary pecuniary 
burden imposed on individuals or their property for public 
purposes, which includes the defrayal of the government’s 
expenses.347  Alternatively, this claim may be entitled to eighth 
priority as a prepetition tax, in an amount up to 30% of the 
controlled group’s collective net worth.348  However, there is 
contrary authority.349  Any amount held not to be entitled to 
priority is asserted as a general unsecured claim. 
The issue most often contested involving the UBL claim is 
the amount.  Debtors and other creditors have challenged 
PBGC’s reliance on its regulation defining the amount of the 
benefit liabilities.350  The usual argument has been that a 
“prudent-investor” interest rate should be used instead of the 
regulation’s interest factor in discounting future benefits.  Two 
courts of appeal have agreed that a prudent-investor approach is 
permissible.351  More recently, however, the tide has turned with 
 
 342.  Id. § 1368(a).   
 343.  Id.   
 344.  Id. § 1368(c)(2).   
 345.  11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).   
 346.  Id. §§ 503(b)(1)(B), 507(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1368(a), (c)(2).   
 347.  New York v. Feiring, 313 U.S. 283, 287 (1941).   
 348.  11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8). 
 349.  In re Bayly Corp., 163 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 1998), aff’g No. Civ. A. 95 N 901, 
90-18983 SBB, 1997 WL 33484011 (D. Colo. Feb. 12, 1997) (denying administrative 
priority as postpetition tax to part of UBL claim, despite net worth in certain 
members of controlled group). 
 350.  29 C.F.R. §§ 4044.52-.75 (2014). 
 351.  PBGC v. Belfance (In re CSC Indus., Inc.), 232 F.3d 505, 508-09 (6th Cir. 
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the help of a Supreme Court decision.352  Although not directly 
addressing ERISA claims, the Court held that, “Creditors’ 
entitlements in bankruptcy arise in the first instance from the 
underlying substantive law creating the debtor’s obligation, 
subject to any qualifying or contrary provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code.”353  In the past decade, PBGC has prevailed 
on the issue.354  Other rulings have upheld settlements based on 
the regulatory method of defining the UBL amount.355 
2. Unpaid Minimum Funding Contributions 
Unpaid contributions are usually the second largest claim 
PBGC asserts in bankruptcy.  Under a tax provision, a lien 
enforceable by PBGC may arise for the failure to pay required 
contributions in excess of $1 million.356  Occasionally, when the 
lien is perfected before bankruptcy, this provision enables PBGC 
on behalf of the plan to assert a secured or partly secured claim 
for unpaid contributions.  The “amount with respect to which a 
lien is imposed” is to be treated as taxes due and owing the 
United States under rules similar to those prescribed for the lien 
for unfunded benefit liabilities.357  Another kind of secured claim 
PBGC infrequently asserts is one negotiated with the sponsor 
under what is commonly called a “minimum funding waiver” in 
certain cases of prebankruptcy business hardship.358 
Early in the history of the Bankruptcy Code, one district 
court affirmed the decision of a bankruptcy court holding that 
the full postpetition contribution was entitled to administrative 
priority.359  PBGC was thereby encouraged to believe that courts 
would treat the entire amount of unpaid contributions becoming 
due after the petition date as an administrative expense.  Later 
 
2000); PBGC v. CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc. (In re CF&I Fabricators of Utah, 
Inc.), 150 F.3d 1293, 1300-01 (10th Cir. 1998).   
 352.  Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 (2000).    
 353.  Id. at 20.   
 354.  Dugan v. PBGC (In re Rhodes), 382 B.R. 550, 560 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2008); In 
re High Voltage Eng’g, No. 05-10787, Order at 2 (Bankr. D. Mass. July 26, 2006); 
Transcript of Record at 32, In re UAL Corp., No. 02-48191 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 
2005); In re US Airways Group, 303 B.R. 784, 798 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003). 
 355.  See, e.g., In re Wolverine Proctor & Schwartz, LLC, No. 06-10815-JNF, 2009 
WL 1271953 (Bankr. D. Mass. May 5, 2009), aff’d, 436 B.R. 253 (D. Mass. 2010), 
aff’d, No. 10-1334 (1st Cir. Apr. 20, 2011).   
 356.  26 U.S.C. § 430(k)(1), (5) (2012).   
 357.  See id. § 430(k)(4)(C).   
 358.  See id. § 412(c).   
 359.  Columbia Packing Co. v. PBGC, 81 B.R. 205, 208-209 (D. Mass. 1988).   
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decisions, however, took a much stricter view and granted 
administrative priority to only a small portion (the “normal 
cost”) of each contribution that becomes payable postpetition.  
Even though under the funding rules of the IRC the entire 
amount becomes payable after the petition date, the courts have 
generally treated the lion’s share of each contribution as a 
prepetition, general unsecured claim.360 
The majority view today is that for contributions becoming 
due postpetition only the amount considered normal cost is 
entitled to treatment as ordinary-course business expenses, and 
thus accorded administrative priority.361  Contributions “arising 
from services rendered within the 180 days before the date of the 
filing of the petition” (or cessation of the debtor’s business if 
earlier) are entitled to fifth priority, subject to a cap.362  
Consistent with the treatment of postpetition contributions, the 
quoted language in the preceding sentence is interpreted to 
apply only to normal cost.  Any contributions not entitled to 
priority are treated as a general unsecured claim. 
3. Annual Premiums 
Annual premiums—that is, flat-rate and variable-rate—are 
usually the smallest PBGC claim in bankruptcy.  Probably for 
that reason there is a dearth of reported cases on their 
treatment.363  In PBGC’s view, unpaid premiums arising 
postpetition are entitled to treatment as an administrative 
expense.364  Alternatively, this claim may be entitled to eighth 
priority as a tax.365  Unpaid premiums arising before the petition 
 
 360.  PBGC v. Belfance (In re CSC Indus.), 232 F.3d 505, 510 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(denying tax priority); PBGC v. CF&1 Fabricators of Utah, Inc. (In re CF & I 
Fabricators of Utah), 150 F.3d 1293, 1297-1300 (10th Cir. 1998) (denying tax priority 
and generally denying administrative expense priority); PBGC v. Sunarhauserman, 
Inc. (In re Sunarhauserman, Inc.), 126 F.3d 811, 819 (6th Cir. 1997) (generally 
denying administrative expense priority). 
 361.  11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b), 507(a)(2) (2012).   
 362.  Id. § 507(a)(5).   
 363.  See In re Kent Plastics Corp., 183 B.R. 841, 847-48 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1995) 
(denying administrative priority to postpetition PBGC premiums).   
 364.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b), 507(a)(2).    
 365.  See id. § 507(a)(8); New Neighborhoods, Inc. v. W. Virginia Workers' Comp. 
Fund, 886 F.2d 714 (4th Cir. 1989) (treating contributions owed to a workers’ 
compensation fund as an eighth-priority excise tax). The structure and operation of 
state workers’ compensation systems vary widely, so the case law must be carefully 
read in assessing the application of such decisions to the treatment of PBGC 
premium claims. 
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date are treated as a general unsecured claim. 
4. Termination Premiums 
Generally, a termination premium obligation arises on plan 
termination, in addition to any other premium due to the 
Corporation.366  That would ordinarily make the termination 
premium a dischargeable “claim” in bankruptcy.  In such a 
circumstance, the termination premium is treated as general 
unsecured claim.  However, if the plan terminates during “any 
bankruptcy reorganization proceeding under [C]hapter 11,” it is 
an obligation that springs only on emergence of the reorganized 
debtor.367  As the leading case explains, “[A]n employer’s 
obligation to pay a Termination Premium on a pension plan that 
is terminated during the course of the bankruptcy does not even 
arise until the bankruptcy itself is terminated.”368 
E. DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ISSUES 
The debtor’s filing of a proposed disclosure statement is 
often a key moment for PBGC to learn the debtor’s intentions 
toward its pension plan.  Especially in Chapter 11 cases where 
PBGC is not a member of the creditors’ committee, the 
disclosure statement may be the first time the agency finds out 
how the debtor proposes to handle pension issues.  
Notwithstanding PBGC’s efforts to focus the debtor’s attention 
early on such matters, the disclosure statement—especially in 
smaller bankruptcies—is all too often silent on the subject of the 
pension plan.  If so, PBGC routinely files an objection to the 
disclosure statement.  In other cases, when the pension plan has 
already terminated or the debtor reveals its intent to seek a 
distress termination, PBGC may object to a disclosure statement 
because it fails adequately to inform creditors of the size of 
PBGC’s claims or their proposed treatment under the plan of 
reorganization.  In practice, such PBGC objections often induce 
the debtor to agree to address the omitted topics in an amended 
disclosure statement. 
 
 366.  29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(7) (2012). 
 367.  11 U.S.C. § 101(5); PBGC v. Oneida Ltd., 562 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2009).   
 368.  Oneida, 562 F.3d at 157.   
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F. PLAN OF REORGANIZATION ISSUES 
1. Prepackaged Plans 
A prepackaged Chapter 11 plan is a bankruptcy plan of 
reorganization that has been negotiated and accepted by 
creditors before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.  Prepetition 
solicitation and voting is permitted under the Bankruptcy 
Code.369  A prepackaged plan differs from the typical plan under 
Chapter 11 in that the sequence of events is altered to move up 
the bargaining, solicitation of support, and submission of 
acceptances or rejections.  Once the bankruptcy proceeding has 
commenced, then the debtor may move immediately for a 
hearing to confirm the plan.  There is no requirement for a 
disclosure statement because the debtor already has enough 
votes to seek plan confirmation.370 
Unless PBGC somehow has advance notice (for example, if 
the debtor needed PBGC’s acceptance to obtain the necessary 
votes for approval), then the debtor may schedule a confirmation 
hearing before PBGC receives notice of the bankruptcy.  This 
may occur, for example, because PBGC’s name was omitted from 
the debtor’s list of creditors entitled to notice.  In such a case, the 
agency must take immediate action to gather information and to 
analyze whether the prepackaged plan may prejudice PBGC.  
For example, the prepackaged plan might result in the debtor’s 
abandoning the pension plan as the debtor heads toward 
liquidation,371 or PBGC’s expected recovery in a hypothetical 
future plan termination might be reduced.  In some prepackaged 
plans, the debtor intends to continue the plan’s pension plan and 
there is no such prejudice.  As in other cases where the pension 
plan is proposed to remain ongoing with the reorganized debtor, 
the agency may nevertheless seek to negotiate protective 
language in the reorganization plan and confirmation order, 
specifying that pension liabilities are not being discharged or 
otherwise altered. 
2. Executory Contracts 
Occasionally a debtor will try to “reject” its pension plan as 
 
 369.  11 U.S.C. § 1126(b), (g).   
 370.  Id. § 1125(g); JOAN N. FEENEY, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 11:46 (5th ed. 
2013).   
 371.  See supra Part III A. 2., at 292-293 (discussing the Friendly Ice Cream case).   
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an executory contract.  PBGC routinely objects to such attempts, 
because Title IV of ERISA is the exclusive means of terminating 
a pension plan.372  The legislative history of ERISA and current 
case law fail to support such a tactic.373 
3. Classification 
The Bankruptcy Code provides little guidance on claim 
classification beyond the general requirement that a plan may 
place a claim in a particular class only if it is “substantially 
similar” to other claims therein.374  Unfairly applied, separate 
classification of similar claims in a plan of reorganization can be 
a tool to gerrymander voting or to give a greater recovery to 
some general unsecured claims at the expense of others.  
Because PBGC’s claims are often the largest in a bankruptcy, 
the agency may be perceived by employees, trade creditors, or 
note holders as a less-deserving governmental creditor.  Thus, 
there are sometimes attempts to place the claims of PBGC or 
other unpopular general unsecured creditors in a separate class.  
PBGC will object to a proposed plan of reorganization where it 
discerns the motive or effect of such treatment to be improper.  
The subject of abusive claim classification is largely governed by 
evolving case law.375  Fortunately, PBGC has encountered fewer 
attempts to manipulate classification in recent years. 
4. Substantive Consolidation 
Substantive consolidation is an equitable remedy whereby 
the assets and liabilities of two or more debtors are consolidated.  
The upshot is that multiple debtors are treated as a single 
debtor for purposes of distribution.376  The standard for 
permitting substantive consolidation varies from circuit to 
circuit, but there are two general approaches.377  According to 
 
 372.  29 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2012).   
 373.  1 Legislative History of the Comprehensive Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 83, 289 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
756, 940; In re Philip Servs. Corp., 310 B.R. 802, 808 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004).    
 374.  11 U.S.C. § 1122(a).   
 375.  See generally 6 NORTON, supra note 229, at § 109:4 (discussing trends in 
interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2012)).   
 376.  See generally 2 NORTON, supra note 229, at §§ 21:3-4 (citing bankruptcy 
court’s authority to exercise general equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) 
(2012)).   
 377.  2 NORTON, supra note 229, at § 21:4.   
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one approach, “The proponent must show not only a substantial 
identity between the entities to be consolidated, but also that 
consolidation is necessary to avoid some harm or to realize some 
benefit.”378  The second approach calls for the court to determine 
the following: “(i) whether creditors dealt with the entities as a 
single economic unit and ‘did not rely on their separate identity 
in extending credit,’ . . . or (ii) whether the affairs of the debtors 
are so entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors.”379 
If members of the plan sponsor’s controlled group are also in 
bankruptcy, often the great majority of claims are against the 
sponsor, which is usually the principal operating company.  By 
contrast, PBGC is often the only significant creditor against 
other debtors, by virtue of its joint and several claims.  
Assuming the pension plan terminates and some debtors in the 
controlled group have significant unencumbered assets, 
substantive consolidation can severely harm PBGC by effectively 
eliminating its joint and several claims and diluting its recovery.  
Absent strong evidence that the requirements for applying this 
remedy are met, PBGC will generally oppose a motion or plan of 
reorganization calling for substantive consolidation.  Unlike 
abuses of classification, ill-founded requests for substantive 
consolidation are as serious a threat to the agency’s interests 
today as ever. 
5. Feasibility 
Before confirming a plan of reorganization, the bankruptcy 
court must find that the plan “is not likely to be followed by the 
liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of 
the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless 
such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan.”380 
Disputes over feasibility can take many forms.  One 
troubling scenario for PBGC is where the debtor proposes to 
continue the pension plan, but under a proposed reorganization 
plan that poses a risk that the sponsor will be unable to fund its 
pension obligations upon emergence from bankruptcy.  If PBGC 
concludes that the debtor’s financial projections are unrealistic, 
it may object to the reorganization plan on the ground of 
 
 378.  Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.), 810 F.2d 270, 276 
(D.C. Cir. 1987).   
 379.  Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking 
Co.), 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988).   
 380.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2012).   
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feasibility.  A different kind of feasibility issue may arise where 
the necessity for plan termination is undisputed.  For example, 
PBGC may object to the proposed reorganization plan if it 
concludes that its claims cannot be paid in accordance with the 
bankruptcy priority rules.381 
6. Third-party Releases 
As part of a plan of reorganization, debtors sometimes ask 
the bankruptcy court to approve releases from liability for 
nondebtors.  The Bankruptcy Code generally provides that 
“discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of 
any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such 
debt.” 382  However, a substantial majority of courts have held 
that this provision does not negate a court’s power to confirm 
plans that contain such provisions, especially if the confirmation 
order enjoins collection activity against certain nondebtors who 
are necessary to the successful reorganization of the debtor or if 
the releases are consensual.383 
PBGC has learned to be vigilant about the use of broad 
language in third-party releases, which may shield fiduciaries of 
pension plans from liability for possible misconduct, or other 
parties with pension obligations.  Whether or not the pension 
plan terminates during bankruptcy, evidence of a fiduciary 
breach may not be discovered until after confirmation.384  In 
either case, it is important to preserve potential claims on behalf 
of the plan against wrongdoers.  When overly expansive release 
language is proposed, PBGC generally objects.  Not only does 
such language run afoul of the Bankruptcy Code’s limitation of 
the effect of discharge, but ERISA provides that “any provision 
of an agreement or instrument that purports to relieve a 
fiduciary from responsibility or liability” to an employee benefit 
plan is “void as against public policy.”385  Finally, broadly 
drafted releases of third parties may shield nondebtors who are 
part of the debtor’s controlled group and otherwise subject to 
PBGC’s joint and several claims.  In practice, such objections are 
usually resolved consensually when the debtor agrees to carve 
 
 381.  Id. § 507(a).  
 382.  Id. § 524(e).   
 383.  See generally 6 NORTON, supra note 229, at § 114:4; 2 ROBERT E. GINSBERG 
& ROBERT D. MARTIN, GINSBERG & MARTIN ON BANKRUPTCY § 13.16 (5th ed. 2014).    
 384.  Id.   
 385.  29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (2012).   
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out such potential claims from the terms of the release 
provisions. 
7. Asset Sales 
The debtor, after notice and a hearing, may generally “use, 
sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, 
property of the estate.”386  Where the debtor proposes to sell 
substantially all its assets, most courts consider a list of factors 
to determine whether the debtor has shown a “good business 
reason” to justify such a transaction.387  In recent years investors 
in bankrupt companies increasingly prefer to structure 
transactions as a purchase of assets, rather than a purchase of 
stock.388  If the buyer does not agree to assume the pension plan 
as part of the transaction, the sale of all or substantially all the 
debtor’s assets may result in abandonment of the pension plan 
with the debtor, which is left behind as a shell company. 
Instead of renegotiating contracts and other obligations of 
the debtor under the formalities of a plan of reorganization, a 
motion for sale of substantially all of the debtor’s assets may 
permit major issues affecting creditors, including the future of 
the pension plan, to be effectively decided with relatively few 
procedural safeguards.  For that reason, PBGC and other 
creditors may object to such a motion on the ground that it 
amounts to what is often termed a sub rosa, or under-the-table, 
plan of reorganization.389  Among the dangers posed by such a 
sale is the lack of sufficient disclosure for parties to determine 
whether the transaction is at arm’s length or represents the 
highest and best offer.  If the buyer does not propose to assume 
the pension plan, then the court is not required to make a 
finding as to whether the plan is affordable.  Often there is too 
little time for PBGC and employee groups to negotiate with the 
buyer to assume the plan or to explore whether another form of 
restructuring might permit the plan to survive. 
 
 386.  11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012).   
 387.  See 2 NORTON, supra note 229, at § 44:17 (citing Comm. Of Equity Sec. 
Holders v. Lionell Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983) (as the 
leading case).   
 388.  Gotbaum Statement, supra note 307, at 3 (section 363 sales of all or 
substantially all assets in large, public company bankruptcies, as a percentage of all 
cases disposed, by year of case disposition, grew from 4% during 1990s to 21% since 
2000).   
 389.  See 2 NORTON, supra note 229, at § 44:17; see also In re Braniff Airways, 
Inc., 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983) (seminal case involving a PBGC objection). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
PBGC-insured pension plans protect more than 40 million 
people.  For decades, PBGC has sought to promote continuation 
of pension plans by sponsors who file for bankruptcy 
reorganization under Chapter 11.  In bankruptcy, PBGC wins a 
case whenever the debtor keeps its pension plan. 
 
